Appellate courts cannot reverse an acquittal where the trial court’s view is plausible.

The prosecution alleged that on 3 September 2012, the respondent drove a car rashly and negligently, causing it to overturn and strike a toilet wall near Karmala, Puttur. The accident allegedly injured the respondent and two passengers, grievously injured another passenger, and caused the death of Mahammad Sinan.

The respondent was charged under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the IPC. The trial court acquitted him on 1 March 2017; the State appealed against that acquittal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the CrPC.

1. Whether the State established grounds for appellate interference with the trial court’s judgment of acquittal.

2. What order should follow from the Court’s determination of that issue.

Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the IPC were the provisions underlying the charges; Section 378 of the CrPC governed the State’s appeal against acquittal.

Relying on Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, Babu Sahebgouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka and H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, the Court stated that an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence and may be reversed only where the trial court’s view is not a plausible one—such as where the judgment is patently perverse, materially misreads or omits evidence, and the evidence permits no reasonable view other than guilt.

The complainant, the alleged eyewitnesses and the spot-mahazar witnesses did not support the prosecution. Although they were treated as hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution, no evidence sufficient to substantiate its case was elicited.

On reappraisal, the High Court found no legal or factual error in the trial court’s assessment and no basis to conclude that the acquittal was perverse or that only a finding of guilt was possible.

The Court dismissed the State’s appeal, leaving the respondent’s acquittal in force.