Appellate courts must not interfere with acquittal where the trial court’s view is reasonably possible.

On 10.11.2018 at approximately 6:00 a.m., the prosecution alleged that Shamshad Ali @ Guddu and four associates called Brijesh outside his house and fired at him.

Brijesh sustained firearm injuries and died; the assailants allegedly fled while firing in the air.

On the written report of Sushil Kumar Mishra, an FIR was registered under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 and 286 IPC, followed by investigation and submission of a charge-sheet against Saddam, Sandeep, Shamshad Ali @ Guddu, Ishtiyaq and Ankur Saroj @ Habbu.

The prosecution examined ten witnesses, including the informant, an alleged eyewitness, the doctor and police officials.

By judgment dated 05.02.2026, the Additional Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh acquitted all five accused, finding that the prosecution had failed to establish their presence and identity at the scene beyond reasonable doubt.

The State consequently sought leave to appeal under Section 378(3) CrPC against the acquittal.

Whether the State should be granted leave under Section 378(3) CrPC to appeal against the accused persons’ acquittal.

Whether the trial court’s appreciation of the prosecution evidence was perverse, legally unsustainable, or based on a view that was not reasonably possible, warranting appellate interference with the acquittal.

Whether the prosecution had established the accused persons’ identity, presence and participation in the alleged firearm attack beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court considered the State’s application under Section 378(3) CrPC for leave to appeal against acquittal and the alleged offences under Sections 147, 148, 302/149, 201 and 286 IPC.

It applied the settled principle that an appellate court has power to reappreciate evidence in an acquittal appeal, but must give due weight to the trial court’s credibility findings and the strengthened or “double” presumption of innocence following acquittal.

Under Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, although the appellate court possesses broad powers, it should not disturb an acquittal where two reasonable views are possible.

Babu v. State of Kerala, Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, Bannareddy v. State of Karnataka, Jayamma v. State of Karnataka, Virendra Singh v. State of U.P. and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar were relied upon for the rule that interference is justified only where the trial court’s approach is patently illegal, perverse, wholly untenable, or founded on a grave misreading of evidence.

The Court also applied the principle that mere availability of a more probable alternative view is insufficient to overturn an acquittal.

The Court found that the trial court had reasonably assessed the evidentiary deficiencies.

PW-1, the deceased’s brother, admitted that he was physically disabled, did not come outside the house and had not seen accused Ishtiyaq at the place of occurrence; the trial court also noted uncertainty regarding his acquaintance with the other accused.

PW-4, projected as an eyewitness, did not identify the accused persons and had not disclosed the assailants’ names to the Investigating Officer.

The accused were allegedly identified through photographs, but no test identification parade was conducted, and they were not identified before the trial court.

The prosecution also failed to produce relevant call-detail/location records, no incriminating article was recovered at the accused persons’ instance, and material contradictions existed in the witnesses’ testimony.

Although the medical evidence supported death from antemortem firearm injuries, it did not by itself establish the identity or participation of the accused.

In light of these deficiencies, the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecution had not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt was a possible and sustainable view, not a perverse or impossible one.

Since the trial court had adopted a reasonably possible view and the prosecution evidence failed to reliably establish the accused persons’ identity and presence at the scene, leave to appeal under Section 378(3) CrPC was refused.

The application for leave to appeal was rejected, and consequently the government appeal was also dismissed.