Article 226 cannot enforce private civil injunctions where police-assistance orders are stayed.

The petitioner sought, inter alia, implementation of an interim injunction order dated 4 October 2023 passed in Title Suit No. 1455 of 2023 by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), 3rd Court at Howrah.

Upon the petitioner’s application, the Civil Court subsequently directed the Officer-in-Charge, Howrah Police Station, by order dated 18 November 2024, to ensure implementation of the injunction.

The said police-assistance order was challenged by respondent no. 8 in C.O. 827 of 2025 under Article 227 of the Constitution. A coordinate Bench stayed its operation on 2 April 2025, and the stay was made absolute until disposal of the revisional application on 24 June 2025. The revisional application remained pending.

Although the petitioner was duly informed of the hearing, no one appeared on the petitioner’s behalf. The Court nevertheless considered the writ petition on merits because it raised a recurring legal issue and could be decided without resolving disputed facts.

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 to direct implementation of an interlocutory order passed in a pending civil suit concerning private property rights.

2. Whether such a direction could be issued when the subsequent Civil Court order directing police assistance had been challenged under Article 227 and its operation had been stayed by a coordinate Bench.

3. Whether the petitioner had demonstrated any independent breach of a statutory or public duty, distinct from the private civil dispute and the orders passed in the civil proceedings.

The Court relied on the principle that writ proceedings under Article 226 are not ordinarily appropriate for adjudicating or enforcing rival private civil rights, particularly disputes concerning immovable property, and cannot substitute ordinary civil remedies, as held in Sohan Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 529, and Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria, (1992) 4 SCC 61.

Merely impleading the police or another public authority does not transform a private property dispute into a public-law proceeding.

Under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Court possesses inherent power to preserve the subject matter of litigation, restore the status quo following breach of an injunction, and, where appropriate, direct police assistance for implementation of its orders, as recognised in Meera Chauhan v. Harsh Bishnoi, (2007) 12 SCC 201.

These principles were reiterated in P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami DharmanandaTheertha Padar, (2006) 4 SCC 501, and Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T., (2019) 2 SCC 329, which affirm that ownership, possession and related private property disputes must ordinarily be determined through civil proceedings.

The relief sought in the writ petition was wholly dependent upon the injunction order dated 4 October 2023 and the consequential police-assistance order dated 18 November 2024 passed in the pending Title Suit.

The petitioner had already invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, which had considered the request for implementation and issued directions.

Since that later order had been stayed and the stay continued until disposal of C.O. 827 of 2025, a writ directing the police to implement the original injunction would substantially reproduce the stayed police-assistance direction.

Such an order would circumvent the pending revisional proceeding and potentially nullify the interim protection granted by the coordinate Bench.

Further, no independent statutory or public duty, severable from the private dispute, was established against the authorities.

The appropriate remedies therefore lay before the Civil Court or in the pending Article 227 proceeding, rather than under Article 226.

It held that the petitioner could not obtain, through a writ of mandamus, implementation of an order arising from a private civil dispute, particularly when the relevant police-assistance order had been stayed in a pending revisional proceeding.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not adjudicated the merits of the parties’ claims, or expressed any view on the subsistence, scope or effect of the injunction dated 4 October 2023; all questions were left open to the Civil Court and the revisional Court.

There was no order as to costs.