Article 227 interference with arbitral procedural orders is confined to exceptional cases.

The claimant challenged the Arbitral Tribunal’s order rejecting its application under Section 19 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to summon 11 persons as witnesses in the arbitration.

The claimant said their evidence was needed to confront them with invoices and other documents already marked as Exs. P1–P16.

The Tribunal noted that the claimant had previously sought to implead the 11 persons, that request had been rejected, and the claimant’s father—not the firm’s proprietor—had testified as PW1. It rejected the witness application and treated the claimant as having no further evidence.

The claimant then invoked Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to challenge that order.

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to interfere with the Tribunal’s rejection of the application to summon the 11 witnesses.

2. Whether the Tribunal’s refusal to summon the witnesses warranted intervention in light of the statutory scheme governing arbitration and the limited scope for judicial interference.

Section 19 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides that an arbitral tribunal is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in conducting proceedings.

The Tribunal observed that a party seeking the Tribunal’s assistance to secure witnesses should apply under Section 27, and noted that no such application had been filed.

The Court relied on Nivedita Sharma v. COAI, (2011) 14 SCC 337, for the principle that writ jurisdiction should not ordinarily bypass a statutory forum.

Deep Industries v. ONGC, (2020) 15 SCC 706, for the principle that Article 227 interference in arbitration matters must be exercised with extreme circumspection and confined to cases of patent lack of inherent jurisdiction.

Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 75, for the principle that intervention beyond the Arbitration Act’s procedure is reserved for exceptional cases, such as where a party is left remediless or bad faith is shown.

The Court noted that the Tribunal had considered the application and relied on the prior refusal to implead the proposed witnesses, the purpose for which they were sought to be examined, and the fact that the relevant documents had already been marked through PW1.

Although the petitioner argued that the witnesses were necessary, the Court found no basis to treat the Tribunal’s decision as a patent jurisdictional defect or as an exceptional case justifying supervisory intervention.

Applying the restrained approach required by the Arbitration Act and the cited precedents, the Court declined to reassess the Tribunal’s evidentiary decision under Article 227.

The Tribunal’s rejection of the application to summon the 11 witnesses therefore remained undisturbed.