Article 227 jurisdiction does not permit interference with concurrent factual findings absent perversity.

The opposite party/pre-emptor’s father purchased 3 decimals from plot no. 76, Jikra Mouza, in 1983 and thereby became a co-sharer.

After his death, the opposite party inherited his interest.

The co-sharer, Arejan Khanam, subsequently transferred 33/10 decimals from the same plot to the petitioner/pre-emptee by a registered sale deed dated 24 April 2007.

Alleging that the petitioner was a stranger purchaser and that the sale had taken place without notice, the opposite party instituted a proceeding under Sections 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.

The Trial Court allowed the pre-emption application on 25 April 2017.

The Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on 6 February 2025 and affirmed that decision.

The petitioner thereafter invoked Article 227 of the Constitution, challenging the findings on limitation, non-joinder, the alleged transfer of the vendor’s entire share, and the conduct of the proceeding.

1. Whether the pre-emption proceeding was barred by limitation, having regard to the date on which registration of the impugned deed was completed.

2. Whether the pre-emption proceeding was defective for non-joinder of the vendor/transferor of the impugned sale deed.

3. Whether the pre-emption application was maintainable when the vendor allegedly transferred her entire share in the plot, or whether only a portion of the unpartitioned plot had been transferred.

4. Whether the concurrent factual findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court warranted interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The Court applied Sections 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, which permit a co-sharer to seek pre-emption of a transfer of a portion of a plot to a stranger purchaser, subject to the statutory requirements.

It held that the vendor or transferor is not a necessary party to such a pre-emption proceeding.

Where registration of the impugned deed is completed during the pendency of the proceeding, the proceeding is not barred by limitation on that ground.

The Court further applied the principle governing Article 227 jurisdiction that the High Court does not ordinarily re-appreciate evidence or substitute its conclusions for concurrent findings of fact, absent perversity, grave dereliction of duty, or flagrant violation of fundamental legal principles.

In support, it relied on Tapashi Mondal v. Binoy Kumar Biswas, reported at (2015) 1 CHN (Cal) 267.

The Trial Court had framed a specific limitation issue and, on examining the impugned deed, found that its registration was completed on 29 June 2015 during the pendency of the proceeding; consequently, the pre-emption application was treated as within limitation.

The High Court upheld the finding that the transferor was not a necessary party.

It also accepted the concurrent factual findings that the pre-emptor acquired co-sharer status through inheritance from his father, that the plot measured 40 decimals, that the vendor transferred only 33/10 decimals, and that the petitioner failed to prove any prior partition or that the vendor had transferred her entire share.

Since the plot remained unpartitioned and only a portion had been transferred to the petitioner, the statutory basis for pre-emption was established.

The alleged procedural shortcomings and evidentiary challenges did not disclose perversity or any exceptional circumstance justifying supervisory interference under Article 227.

It held that the pre-emption proceeding was not barred by limitation, that non-joinder of the vendor was not fatal, and that the opposite party had established the status of a co-sharer in respect of an unpartitioned plot from which only a portion had been transferred to the petitioner.

Finding no grave dereliction, perversity, or violation of fundamental legal principles, the Court declined to interfere under Article 227 and dismissed C.O. 3874 of 2025.

There was no order as to costs.