Article 227 jurisdiction will not disturb reasoned condonation of delayed written statements absent perversity.

The Petitioner challenged, under Article 227 of the Constitution, the order dated 25.08.2023 passed by the Family Court-01, Shahdara, Delhi, in ML No. 57/2019.

By that order, the Family Court allowed the Respondent’s application under Order IX Rule 7 read with Section 151 CPC, condoned the delay in filing his Written Statement, and took it on record subject to payment of costs of ₹3,000 to the Petitioner.

The Respondent had failed to appear or file his Written Statement, resulting in his defence being struck off by an earlier order dated 07.12.2022.

He subsequently filed the application dated 15.05.2023 after a delay of 174 days.

The Family Court noted that although the Respondent, an advocate, had failed to remain vigilant, the proceedings concerned dissolution of marriage and denial of an opportunity to defend would cause serious prejudice.

1. Whether the Family Court erred in condoning the Respondent’s 174-day delay in filing the Written Statement and in taking it on record subject to costs?

2. Whether the Family Court’s exercise of discretion disclosed a patent jurisdictional error, perversity, manifest illegality, or gross failure of justice warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution?

The Court applied the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, which is limited to keeping subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and does not permit appellate reappreciation of facts or substitution of another possible view; interference is justified only for patent perversity, manifest illegality, grave dereliction of duty, violation of natural justice, or gross failure of justice, as stated in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil and Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel.

It relied on Kailash v. Nanhku, which holds that Order VIII Rule 1 CPC is directory and that extension beyond the prescribed period may be granted exceptionally for recorded reasons, although procedural timelines must ordinarily be respected and delay cannot be condoned routinely.

Bharat Kalra v. Raj Kishan Chhabra establishes that delay in filing a Written Statement may, in an appropriate case, be compensated through costs rather than by denying the defence altogether.

In matrimonial proceedings, Shraddha Ashish Deshbhratar v. Ashish Ramchandra Deshbhratar and WG CDR (Retd.) Rakesh Lal Kapur v. Sumeeta Tuli Kapur recognise that procedural rules must be applied flexibly and balanced against the need for adjudication on merits and preservation of an effective defence.

The Court also referred to Smt. K.S. Sumi Mol v. Suresh Kumar E.K. concerning procedural timelines in Family Courts, and Komal Gupta v. Amrendra Kumar Gupta, which holds that Family Courts should adopt a comparatively liberal approach in family disputes while imposing conditions to prevent intentional delay.

The Court acknowledged that procedural timelines serve the important purposes of preventing delay, ensuring expeditious disposal, and avoiding prejudice to the opposite party, particularly in matrimonial proceedings.

However, delay alone was not treated as determinative.

Applying Kailash, the Court held that the Family Court retained a limited discretion to permit a delayed Written Statement where the circumstances justified preserving a fair opportunity of defence.

The Family Court had expressly noticed the Respondent’s lack of vigilance and the fact that he was an advocate, but balanced that lapse against the matrimonial nature of the proceedings and the serious prejudice that would result if his defence were permanently shut out.

The delay was addressed by imposing costs of ₹3,000, thereby compensating the Petitioner while allowing the dispute to be decided on its merits.

Since the Family Court’s decision was based on relevant considerations, was neither mechanical nor arbitrary, and did not contravene the governing principles, the High Court held that no ground for supervisory interference under Article 227 was made out.

The Impugned Order did not suffer from perversity, manifest illegality, jurisdictional error, or gross failure of justice.

Accordingly, the petition was dismissed, and the pending applications were also disposed of.