Belagavi Landowner’s Revenue Entries Stand As Karnataka HC Rejects State’s 1,255-Day-Late ULC Appeal Over Unauthorised Revenue Inspector Takeover

The respondent, as legal representative of Gawadu Siddappa Patil, challenged the State’s action concerning land declared excess under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. The learned Single Judge held that the proceedings had abated under Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repealing Act because the State had not established that possession was taken in compliance with Section 10(6) of the principal Act; the recorded possession had been taken by a Revenue Inspector, whom the Court found was not the competent authority

The State appealed nearly four years after the Single Judge’s order and sought condonation of a delay of 1,255 days, attributing it to administrative processing and delay in drafting the appeal.

Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repealing Act provides for abatement of proceedings where possession has not been taken in accordance with law; Section 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act governs the taking of possession of excess vacant land.

An application to condone delay requires a satisfactory explanation amounting to “sufficient cause”; administrative delay or the movement of files between offices does not, without more, justify prolonged delay. The State is subject to limitation and must act with diligence, and the law protects the diligent, not the indolent. The Court considered authorities on both liberal and strict approaches to condonation, including State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, and State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girla High School.

The State’s affidavit largely described internal administrative steps—seeking opinions, obtaining approvals, collecting records, and drafting the appeal—but did not provide a satisfactory justification for the delay of nearly four years. The Court therefore declined to allow the State to reopen the matter on the basis of that explanation.

On the underlying possession issue, the State’s assertion that a general authorization existed was raised too late: the authorization had not been placed before the Single Judge, and the document tendered before the Division Bench was neither timely nor convincing as the authorization required by law. The Single Judge’s finding that possession had not been shown to have been taken in compliance with Section 10(6) consequently remained undisturbed.

The writ appeal was dismissed; pending interlocutory applications were disposed of as not calling for adjudication.