Belated filing of an appeal does not justify prolonged non-compliance with a writ order.

The petitioner filed a contempt petition alleging wilful disobedience of the writ court’s order dated 18 December 2024, by which the authorities were directed to calculate and pay the applicable incentives/subsidies, preferably within eight weeks from receipt of the order.

Although the order was uploaded on 5 June 2025, the State authorities did not comply within the stipulated period, and the petitioner instituted contempt proceedings in September 2025 after waiting an additional month.

The Bihar South Power Distribution Company Ltd. filed a show-cause response, but the State authorities repeatedly sought time and failed to file their response.

On 3 July 2026, the coordinate Bench directed that the concerned opposite parties be personally present if a show cause was not filed by the next date.

On 20 August 2026, the State authorities disclosed that LPA No. 737 of 2026 had been filed and registered, nearly one-and-a-half years after the writ order and shortly before the hearing of the contempt petition.

Whether the prolonged failure of the State authorities to implement the writ court’s order directing calculation and payment of incentives/subsidies constituted wilful disobedience warranting contempt action?

Whether the belated filing of LPA No. 737 of 2026, after contempt proceedings had commenced and shortly before the hearing, could justify non-compliance with the writ court’s order?

What directions should be issued in view of the subsequent filing of the appeal and the continuing non-compliance?

The Court applied the principle that judicial orders must be obeyed unless stayed or set aside, and that deliberate or contumacious non-compliance may attract contempt jurisdiction.

It relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Israr Ahmad Khan v. Amarnath Prasad & Ors., including the observations that delayed appeals should be exceptional, that the mere production of a diary, filing, or stamp-reporting number cannot be used to justify continuing disobedience or secure repeated adjournments, and that such conduct—particularly by the State or bodies falling within Article 12—may undermine the authority of courts and the rule of law.

The Court also proceeded on the principle that the subsequent filing of an appeal does not, by itself, erase or suspend the obligation to comply with the operative order in the absence of an order staying its implementation.

The writ court had issued a specific direction to calculate and pay the incentives/subsidies within eight weeks of receipt of the order.

The State failed to comply even after the expiry of that period, after the institution of contempt proceedings, and despite repeated opportunities granted by the coordinate Bench.

The filing of LPA No. 737 of 2026 on 20 August 2026—almost one-and-a-half years after the writ order and immediately before the scheduled contempt hearing—was viewed as a belated procedural step resembling the conduct deprecated by the Supreme Court in Israr Ahmad Khan.

Although the Court strongly criticised the State’s “brazenness,” it took note of the fact that the appeal had ultimately been filed and therefore deferred a final coercive determination, instead directing the State to pursue the appeal and report its progress.

However, rather than immediately concluding the contempt proceedings, it directed the opposite parties to take steps to ensure that LPA No. 737 of 2026 proceeded effectively and to file a fresh show cause concerning developments in the appeal within three months.

The contempt petition was consequently directed to be listed on 11 December 2026.