Bhumidhari rights cannot be granted on public utility land through unauthorized administrative re-categorization by revenue officers.

Prior to 1992, the subject land in District Hardoi, U.P., was recorded as Category-6 (barren/non-agricultural/public utility land) under the U.P. Land Records Manual.

In October 1992, the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) approved a recommendation to re-categorize the land to Category-5 (cultivable land), subsequently granting pattas (leases) to the appellant.

During consolidation proceedings in 2016, a report revealed that the land was originally "public utility land" (specifically khalihan and pasture land) referable to Section 132 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 ("Abolition Act"), making it ineligible for the conferment of bhumidhari rights.

Consequently, the Consolidation Officer expunged the appellant’s name from the revenue records in 2019.

The appellant challenged this, asserting that the SDO had the authority to change the land's category and that the proceedings were barred by res judicata due to a failed 1994 attempt to cancel the pattas.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, leading to this appeal.

Section 132 of the Abolition Act mandates that bhumidhari rights shall not accrue in certain lands, including pasture lands, lands covered by water, or lands held for public purposes.

Section 195 of the Abolition Act stipulates that admission to land by the Land Management Committee is subject to the prohibitions in Section 132.

Legal maxim Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum (what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly).

Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi, emphasizing the protection of communal resources.

Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab, which prohibits the allotment of public utility land to private individuals through administrative manipulation.

The Court observed that Category-6 land encompasses public utility areas like khalihan and pasture land, which fall strictly under the prohibitory ambit of Section 132 of the Abolition Act.

It rejected the appellant's reliance on Paragraph Ka-155-Ka of the Land Records Manual, clarifying that the SDO's power to "transfer land from one class/category of khata to another" refers to the status of the tenure holder, not the physical character or classification of the land itself.

The Court reasoned that only the State Government, under Section 117(6) of the Abolition Act and Section 77(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Code, 2006, possesses the authority to change the class of public utility land, and only under stringent safeguards.

Allowing subordinate officers to re-categorize land would render the statutory prohibitions of Section 132 nugatory.

Regarding res judicata, the Court found that the 1994 dismissal was based on a threshold failure to prove the execution of the pattas, rather than an adjudication on the merits or legality of the lease; thus, the principle did not apply.

The Court held that the re-categorization was void, and consequently, the pattas granted to the appellant were void ab initio as bhumidhari rights cannot accrue on public utility land.

The Court affirmed that consolidation authorities were justified in correcting the revenue records to reflect the land's original character.

No costs were ordered.