Bombay HC Bars Late Landowner’s Daughter’s Restoration Bid For Slum-Rehab Plot, Holding MLRC Section 36A Applies Only To Agricultural Land

Jyoti Builders was implementing a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme over land in Goregaon (East), including CTS No. 619, the subject property.

Laxmibai Mangal Page, claiming through her father, an original owner and member of a Scheduled Tribe, sought restoration of the property under Section 36A of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (MLRC).

The property had been declared a slum in 1987 and was subsequently developed with rehabilitation buildings.

The Collector’s Sub-Divisional Officer had made an order concerning the transfers in 2005; later, on Page’s request, the State issued a letter dated 23 June 2025 directing the Collector to take action under Section 36A(6).

Jyoti Builders and two housing societies challenged that letter and the proposed restoration proceedings under Article 226.

1. Whether Section 36A of the MLRC could be invoked to restore land that had been declared a slum, converted to non-agricultural use and developed with rehabilitation buildings.

2. Whether, in the circumstances, the State’s direction to the Collector to proceed under Section 36A(6), and Page’s restoration application, could be sustained.

Section 36A of the MLRC was treated as applying to agricultural land, with the personal-cultivation and economic-holding conditions in Section 36A(6) indicating that the land must be capable of agricultural cultivation.

The Court relied on Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra, (1985) 1 SCC 479, and Jayvant Laxman Bagad v. Sub-Divisional Officer, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1892, for the proposition that the relevant protective provisions do not apply to land already converted to non-agricultural use.

It also relied on Jai Ganesh SRA CHS (prop.) v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 5176, and Harasiddh Corporation v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2034, concerning land covered by slums and the application of Section 36A in the SRA context.

Under Arun Kumar v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 732, a jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction; under Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, (1954) 1 SCC 710, an order made without subject-matter jurisdiction is a nullity.

The Court found that the subject property fell within a 1957 notification relating to areas reserved for non-agricultural and industrial development, had been declared a slum in 1987, had long been used for non-agricultural purposes, and was occupied by completed rehabilitation buildings.

It held that the land was not capable of the personal cultivation contemplated by Section 36A(6); therefore, the necessary jurisdictional fact for proceedings under Section 36A was absent.

On that basis, neither the earlier SDO order nor the State’s later direction could sustain further restoration proceedings under that provision.

It allowed Writ Petition No. 4418 of 2025 in terms of prayers (a)–(c) and Writ Petition No. 4488 of 2025 in terms of prayers (a)–(d); it also held that Page’s restoration application dated 27 August 2019 could not be considered.