01Facts
Respondent No. 1 was appointed as a teacher and later as Headmistress.
¶ 3.1–3.4She held a D.Ed. qualification from a private institute; the Management disclosed this in the proposal for age relaxation, which the Education Officer granted.
¶ 3.1–3.4, 15In 1997, the State issued a circular providing for the continuation of certain untrained teachers and time to complete the required training. The Management nevertheless terminated Respondent No. 1 in February 1998 on the ground that she was untrained.
¶ 16–20The School Tribunal allowed her appeal, set aside the termination, and directed reinstatement with full back wages. The Management challenged that decision by writ petition.
¶ 2, 6–702Issues
i.1. Whether the Management could terminate Respondent No. 1 for lacking a recognised D.Ed. qualification without first giving her the opportunity to complete the required training contemplated by the State circular and Government Resolution.
¶ 16–24ii.2. Whether the Tribunal’s order warranted interference in the Management’s writ petition, particularly given that Respondent No. 1 had not established that she completed the required training within the prescribed period.
¶ 33–3403Law Applied
Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, provides a remedy of appeal to the School Tribunal against specified employment decisions.
¶ 3The State circular dated 5 November 1997 provided for continuation of the covered untrained teachers and an opportunity to complete the necessary training; termination could follow where a teacher failed to complete that training despite being given the opportunity.
¶ 16, 20–21The Government Resolution dated 2 June 2000 similarly provided for protection and regularisation of covered teachers, subject to its terms and an opportunity to complete the required training.
¶ 19, 23–24Relying on the Full Bench decision in St. Ulai High School v. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh, the Court reiterated that Education Officer approval is not a condition precedent to a valid appointment.
¶ 25In exercising writ jurisdiction, the Court found no basis to interfere where the Tribunal’s view was not perverse and was a probable view.
¶ 34Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. Section 9
04Reasoning
The Management knew of Respondent No. 1’s private-institute D.Ed. qualification when it appointed her as Headmistress and sought age relaxation; that qualification was disclosed to and considered by the Education Department.
¶ 15, 25, 28The stated reason for termination was her untrained status, but the 1997 circular and 2000 Government Resolution required that she first be given an opportunity to complete the necessary training.
¶ 20–26The Management’s letter seeking permission to continue her service did not itself amount to giving her that opportunity, and its subsequent reliance on the Education Authority’s view that she was ineligible did not displace the protections under those instruments.
¶ 20–26The Court therefore held that her failure to complete D.Ed. during the later proceedings did not cure the Management’s failure to provide the required opportunity before termination.
¶ 33It found no perversity in the Tribunal’s decision.
¶ 3405Holding
The Court answered the first issue in the negative: the Management could not terminate Respondent No. 1 without first providing the opportunity to complete the required training.
¶ 34–35It found no ground to interfere with the Tribunal’s order and dismissed the writ petition, discharged the Rule, and made no order as to costs.
¶ 34–35Original Court PDF
Progeressive Education Society And Ors.vsSou. Madhavi B. Joshi And Ors.
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