Breach of a genuine promise to marry, without initial fraudulent intent, does not constitute rape.

The victim, an adult woman, alleged that the appellant, a schoolteacher known to her family, promised to marry her and took her to his house on 25 January 2015.

She alleged that, after dinner, he forcibly had sexual intercourse with her and assured her that he would marry her.

She further alleged that the appellant again took her to his house on 10 February 2015, where physical relations were established on 10 and 11 February 2015, and subsequently refused to marry her.

An FIR was registered under Sections 376 and 417 IPC; after investigation, the appellant was charged under Sections 376 and 419 IPC, while his mother was charged under Section 109 IPC.

The trial court acquitted the appellant’s mother but convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹25,000, with a further one-year sentence in default.

The appellant preferred the present appeal.

In evidence, the victim admitted that she was a major, had gone to the appellant’s house with her consent, had remained there overnight, and had consensual physical relations with him on the later visits.

The appellant subsequently visited her parents and expressed willingness to marry her, but the marriage did not take place due to opposition from his family.

Whether the sexual relationship between the appellant and the adult victim was vitiated by a false promise of marriage amounting to a misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC, thereby constituting rape under Section 376 IPC?

Whether the evidence established that the appellant had no intention to marry the victim from the inception of the promise, as opposed to a mere subsequent breach of promise?

Whether the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under Section 376 IPC were sustainable?

The court applied Sections 375 and 376 IPC concerning rape and Section 90 IPC concerning consent vitiated by misconception of fact.

Relying on Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88, and the principles discussed in Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, the court held that a false promise to marry vitiates consent only where the promise was made in bad faith, with no intention of being fulfilled from the outset, and had a direct nexus with the woman’s decision to engage in sexual intercourse.

A mere breach of a genuine promise, including failure to marry due to subsequent or unforeseen circumstances, does not amount to rape; the prosecution must establish the accused’s fraudulent intention at the inception of the promise.

The court found that the victim was a major and had voluntarily accompanied the appellant to his house with the knowledge and consent of her father.

Although she alleged force during the first incident, her subsequent conduct was inconsistent with the prosecution’s case that the relationship was induced solely by deception: she returned to the appellant’s house on 10 February 2015, remained there overnight, and expressly stated that the later physical relations were consensual.

The appellant also subsequently visited the victim’s parents and expressed willingness to marry her.

The evidence indicated that the marriage failed because of opposition from the appellant’s family, particularly his mother, rather than because the appellant had lacked any intention to marry from the beginning.

Accordingly, the court treated the case as one involving a possible breach of promise rather than a false promise made with fraudulent intent.

The prosecution therefore failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim’s consent was vitiated by misconception of fact or that the promise of marriage had a direct nexus with the sexual relationship.

The evidence disclosed, at most, a subsequent breach of promise and did not satisfy the ingredients of rape under Section 376 IPC.

The conviction and sentence dated 19 December 2016 were set aside, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant—already on bail—was discharged from the liability of his bail bonds.

The trial court record was directed to be returned, and any pending interlocutory application was disposed of.