01Facts
The petitioner filed a suit for partition and separate possession and sought a temporary injunction restraining the respondent from alienating or encumbering the suit properties.
pp. 2–3 · ¶ 2The Trial Court allowed the application; on the respondent’s appeal, the First Appellate Court set aside that order and dismissed the application, principally because the petitioner’s name did not appear in the revenue records and the properties’ joint-family character was not established by documents.
pp. 2–3, 6–8 · ¶ 2, 7The petitioner challenged the appellate judgment under Article 227 of the Constitution.
p. 2 · ¶ 102Issues
i.1. Whether the First Appellate Court erred in reversing the Trial Court’s temporary-injunction order by assessing the disputed ownership and character of the properties at the interlocutory stage.
pp. 6–9 · ¶ 7–8ii.2. Whether the impugned appellate judgment warranted interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.
p. 9 · ¶ 803Law Applied
Under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, temporary injunctive relief is considered by reference to the requirements of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.
p. 8 · ¶ 8The court should not conduct a mini-trial at the interlocutory stage to determine whether disputed properties are ancestral or joint-family properties; those questions are for trial.
p. 8 · ¶ 8The High Court also referred to the narrow scope of judicial review under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC in considering an appeal from an injunction order.
p. 8 · ¶ 8The judgment identifies no precedent as the basis for the High Court’s decision.
04Reasoning
The First Appellate Court relied on the absence of the petitioner’s name in the revenue records and the lack of documents establishing joint-family ownership to conclude that no prima facie case existed.
pp. 5–8 · ¶ 7–8The High Court held that this approach improperly determined matters requiring trial, rather than assessing the injunction application without conducting a mini-trial.
pp. 5–8 · ¶ 7–8It also noted that the appellate judgment had not adequately addressed the Trial Court’s reasoning concerning the alleged risk of alienation and resulting multiplicity of proceedings.
pp. 5–8 · ¶ 7–8The appellate judgment was therefore arbitrary and erroneous.
pp. 5–8 · ¶ 7–805Holding
The High Court allowed the writ petition.
p. 9 · ¶ 9The High Court set aside the First Appellate Court’s judgment dated 2 February 2026, and restored the Trial Court’s order dated 5 February 2025 allowing I.A. No. 1 in O.S. No. 286/2023.
p. 9 · ¶ 9Original Court PDF
HONNAPPAvsBASAPPA
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