Calcutta High Court acquits accountant in Vanaspati case, citing defective sampling and later removal of the melting-point limit

On 28 September 2007, a Food Inspector took a sample of Vanaspati from a 15 kg tin at a Kolkata hotel. The Public Analyst reported a melting point of 42.4°C, above the then-prescribed maximum of 41°C; a Central Food Laboratory report also found an elevated melting point.

The petitioner, a company director and Chartered Accountant, was convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Sections 7 and 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (“PFA Act”), and sentenced to imprisonment and a fine. His appeal was dismissed.

In revision, he challenged the sampling method, his vicarious liability despite the company’s nominated person, and the effect of a 2013 notification deleting the Vanaspati melting-point limit.

Whether the sampling method—drawing from an open tin with a “big hole” and using a spoon and bowl supplied by the vendor—vitiated the analytical reports and the prosecution case.

Whether the petitioner could be held criminally liable as a director when the company had designated a nominated person under Section 17 of the PFA Act and there was no evidence of his involvement in manufacturing or quality control.

What effect the 2013 deletion of the Vanaspati melting-point limit had on a conviction based on the earlier limit.

Whether the concurrent judgments were perverse or legally flawed so as to warrant revisional intervention.

The Court applied Sections 7 and 16(1)(a)(i) of the PFA Act, which prohibit the sale of adulterated food and provide for punishment; Section 17, which addresses offences by companies and the liability of persons responsible for their business; and Sections 13(2) and 13(3), concerning analysis of a counterpart sample and the evidentiary status of the Central Food Laboratory report.

It also considered the sampling protocol identified as Bureau of Indian Standards IS:548.

It also considered the 2013 FSSAI notification deleting the Vanaspati melting-point limit.

It also considered the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Sections 482 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The judgment states that company officers are not automatically liable merely because they are directors where a nominated person is in place; it requires evidence linking the officer to the offence through involvement, consent, connivance, or negligence.

The Court held that the sample’s reliability was undermined because it was taken from a previously opened tin and collected and mixed using ordinary utensils rather than the sampling method it considered appropriate for solid fats; it therefore treated the analytical reports as lacking legal value.

It further found that the petitioner’s directorship and admission under Section 313 CrPC did not establish personal culpability, particularly given the nominated person’s recorded appointment and the absence of evidence connecting the petitioner to production or quality control.

Finally, it considered the 2013 deletion of the melting-point limit a significant supervening change and faulted the appellate court for not addressing it; together, these matters established, in the Court’s view, perversity and non-application of mind warranting revisional intervention.

It allowed the revision, set aside and quashed the trial and appellate judgments insofar as they concerned the petitioner, acquitted him, discharged his bail bonds, and directed that any fine he had deposited be refunded.