Ceiling proceedings initiated against a deceased person are void ab initio and cannot be sustained.

The petitioner claimed rights in approximately 1,501 bighas of land situated at Village Banediya, including Banediya Tank, and challenged ceiling proceedings initiated under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (“Ceiling Act”).

The original owner, Sardar Madhavrao Kibe, allegedly died on 12 October 1963, whereas notice under Section 10 of the Ceiling Act was issued in his name on 15 July 1964.

Ceiling proceedings were subsequently resumed in 1999; a draft statement was prepared on 13 April 2000 and a final statement under Section 11(6) was published on 24 May 2000.

The petitioner filed objections under Section 11(3), which were rejected by the Collector by order dated 27 June 2025.

1. Whether ceiling proceedings initiated through a Section 10 notice issued in the name of a person who had already died were void and rendered the subsequent proceedings a nullity?

2. Whether the original owner was a “holder” of the land on the appointed day so as to attract Sections 9 and 10 of the Ceiling Act?

3. Whether a tank could be treated as “land” under Section 2(k) of the Ceiling Act?

4. Whether the competent authority had jurisdiction, particularly in view of Section 2(e), the alleged expiry of the statutory period under Section 11(9), and the authority of the SDO to issue the notice?

5. Whether the impugned order was vitiated by violation of natural justice, non-supply of relevant documents, non-application of mind, and absence of adequate reasons?

6. Whether the High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 despite the availability of a statutory appeal or revision?

The Court applied Sections 2(e), 2(h), 2(k), 2(p), 9, 10 and 11(9) of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960.

Sections 9 and 10 contemplate proceedings against a “holder” who holds land exceeding the ceiling area, while Section 2(h) defines “holder” as a tenure-holder, occupancy tenant or Government lessee; Section 2(k) defines “land” as land held for agricultural purposes but excludes land diverted to or used for non-agricultural purposes.

The Court applied the principle that where a statute prescribes a particular mode of exercising power, the authority must act in that manner or not at all, as stated in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka, Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill and Tata Chemicals v. Commissioner.

It further relied on the rule that proceedings or orders passed against a dead person, or by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction, are void and non est, as recognised in Ashok Transport Agency v. Awadesh Kumar, C. Muttu v. Bharath Match Works and Sarup Singh v. Union of India.

The Court also applied the exceptions to the alternative-remedy rule under Article 226 where there is violation of natural justice or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction, relying on Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Tamilnadu Cements Corporation v. Unicon Engineers.

The Court found that the Section 10 notice was issued in 1964 in the name of Sardar Madhavrao Kibe, who had died in 1963.

Since the statutory proceedings were initiated against a dead person and no valid notice was shown to have been issued to his legal representatives, the foundational notice was treated as a nullity; consequently, no rights could accrue to the State from the subsequent proceedings.

The Court further accepted, prima facie and on the record before it, that Kibe was not in possession and was not the “holder” of the land on the appointed day because possession had allegedly been taken by the State in 1960.

Accordingly, the jurisdictional conditions under Sections 9 and 10 were not satisfied.

The Court also accepted the petitioner’s challenge that the tank could not, on the facts pleaded and the statutory definition in Section 2(k), automatically be treated as agricultural “land” for ceiling purposes.

It held that the objections regarding the expiry of the authority’s mandate under Section 11(9), the competent authority’s jurisdiction, and the procedural defects could not be rejected merely because they were raised by a subsequent purchaser rather than the original holder, since jurisdictional defects may be challenged at any stage.

The impugned order was additionally found to be mechanical, inadequately reasoned, and passed without supplying all documents relied upon by the authorities, thereby offending natural justice.

Given the apparent jurisdictional defects and violation of natural justice, the Court exercised its Article 226 jurisdiction notwithstanding the alternative statutory remedy.

It held that the Section 10 proceedings initiated against the deceased Sardar Madhavrao Kibe were a nullity; that the statutory requirements concerning a “holder” and the appointed day had not been established; and that the proceedings and impugned order were also vitiated by jurisdictional errors, violation of natural justice, and lack of proper reasoning.

The order dated 27 June 2025, the draft statement dated 13 April 2000, and the connected ceiling proceedings were set aside.

The respondents were directed to make the necessary consequential amendments in the revenue records as expeditiously as possible.