Challenges to PMLA attachment involving disputed facts must be pursued through statutory appeal.

The appellants challenged a Provisional Attachment Order (“PAO”) issued under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”), attaching their properties as proceeds of crime or property of equivalent value.

They contended that they were not named as accused in the FIR concerning the predicate offence and that their properties could not consequently be attached.

During the pendency of W.P.(C) 11796/2025, the learned Single Judge permitted the Adjudicating Authority to proceed, subject to the outcome of the writ petition.

The Adjudicating Authority thereafter passed an order dated 23 September 2025 confirming the attachment.

By order dated 23 July 2026, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition and relegated the appellants to the statutory appellate remedy under Section 26 of the PMLA.

The present intra-court appeal challenged that order.

Whether the appellants’ objection that their properties could not be attached because they were not named as accused in the predicate-offence FIR raised a question of inherent lack of jurisdiction warranting exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the availability of an appeal under Section 26 of the PMLA, with a further appeal under Section 42, justified relegating the appellants to the statutory remedy after confirmation of the PAO by the Adjudicating Authority.

Whether the interim observation that the Adjudication Order would remain subject to the outcome of the writ petition precluded the learned Single Judge from subsequently directing the appellants to pursue the statutory remedy.

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, under which the availability of an alternative statutory remedy ordinarily operates as a rule of self-restraint and not as an absolute bar; however, writ jurisdiction may be exercised where the impugned action suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction.

Section 5 of the PMLA empowers the Directorate of Enforcement to provisionally attach property, including property of equivalent value falling within the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u).

Once confirmed, the PAO merges into the Adjudication Order, against which an appeal lies under Section 26 of the PMLA, followed by a further appeal to the High Court under Section 42.

The Court relied on the principles concerning alternative remedies discussed in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95, and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603.

The Court distinguished Bharati Sahakari Bank Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 2536, because that case involved secured-creditor rights and the interplay between the PMLA and the SARFAESI Act.

The Court held that the appellants’ submission that their properties could not be attached merely because they were not named as accused did not establish an inherent absence of jurisdiction under Section 5 of the PMLA.

At most, it alleged an erroneous exercise of otherwise available jurisdiction and involved disputed factual questions concerning the source, ownership and beneficial ownership of the properties; such questions were suitable for determination in the statutory appeal and not in writ proceedings.

Since the PAO had been confirmed, it no longer operated independently and had merged into the Adjudication Order, making the appeal under Section 26 the appropriate and efficacious remedy.

The Court further found that Bharati Sahakari was distinguishable because the present properties stood in the appellants’ own names and no competing statutory regime or prior secured interest was involved.

The earlier interim direction preserving the writ petition’s outcome did not prevent the Single Judge from later declining writ adjudication after the Adjudication Order had been passed.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not examined the merits of the attachment or the appellants’ jurisdictional objections; all rights and contentions were kept open for consideration by the Appellate Tribunal, uninfluenced by the observations in the impugned order or the appellate judgment.

Pending applications were disposed of and there was no order as to costs.