Child sexual assault survivor need not recount every detail to a doctor for her testimony to stand, Kerala High Court rules

The prosecution alleged that the appellant sexually assaulted PW1, who was under 18, at her home on 3 August 2021 and in a bathroom on 24 September 2021, and that the assaults resulted in her pregnancy

The Special Court convicted him under Sections 450, 342, 376(2)(n), and 506(ii) IPC and Sections 3(a) read with 4, 5(j)(ii) read with 6, and 5(l) read with 6 of the POCSO Act; it imposed, among other sentences, 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment for each aggravated POCSO offence, to run concurrently

On appeal, the appellant challenged the proof of two separate assaults and the reliability of the DNA evidence identifying him as the foetus’s biological father.

Whether the medical history recorded by PW10, which did not mention two separate assaults, materially undermined PW1’s evidence and the finding of repeated sexual assault under Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act

Whether the DNA evidence was reliable despite the appellant’s challenge to the collection, preservation, and transportation of the samples, and established the offence under Section 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act

Whether the evidence otherwise supported the convictions under the IPC and POCSO Act, and whether the convictions or sentences required appellate interference

The Court considered Sections 450, 342, 376(2)(n), and 506(ii) IPC and Sections 3(a), 4, 5(j)(ii), 5(l), and 6 of the POCSO Act.

It held that a doctor’s record of a sexual-assault victim’s history is ordinarily made for diagnosis and treatment; the victim is not required to provide the doctor with a complete account in the detail expected in a police or magistrate’s statement, and omissions from that medical history do not, without more, constitute material contradictions.

DNA evidence may be relied upon where the evidence supports the integrity of the sample collection and forwarding process; on the facts, the Court found no deficiency warranting rejection of the DNA report.

The Court also treated 20 years as the statutory minimum sentence for the offences under Sections 5(j)(ii) and 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The appellant cited Mehtab v. State of Uttarakhand and Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra on DNA procedure; the judgment records those authorities as part of his submissions.

The Court accepted PW1’s account of two assaults and held that the absence of both incidents from the medical history recorded by PW10 did not discredit her testimony: the history was taken for medical purposes, not as a formal evidentiary statement, and a victim should not be expected to repeat every detail to the doctor.

As to paternity, the Court relied on the evidence of the doctors and investigating officer, the sample-collection mahazar, and the DNA report, finding that the samples had been handled in a tamper-proof manner and that no demonstrated procedural deficiency justified rejecting the report.

On reappreciation of the evidence, it found the convictions proved and declined to reduce the POCSO sentences because they were already at the statutory minimum.