CISF may compulsorily retire personnel based on their entire service record, including past penalties, absent arbitrariness or perversity.

The respondent was an Inspector in the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), posted at the Eastern Coalfields Limited unit at Sitalpur. By order dated 14 June 2016, issued by the Deputy Inspector General, CISF North Eastern Zone, he was prematurely retired with immediate effect and paid three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of notice.

He challenged the order in WPA No. 30572 of 2016. The learned Single Judge quashed the premature-retirement order, directed reconsideration by an appropriate review committee under Fundamental Rule 56(j) and Rule 48 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, and ordered reinstatement with consequential arrears if the respondent had not attained the age of superannuation. The Union of India appealed, contending that the respondent’s case had been considered by the competent Superannuation Review Committee constituted under CISF Circular No. 16/2015 and that the decision was based on his entire service record, including two major and five minor punishments.

Whether the Superannuation Review Committee constituted under CISF Circular No. 16/2015 was competent to consider the respondent’s premature retirement, notwithstanding the committee contemplated under Appendix IX of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.

Whether the premature-retirement decision was vitiated because the respondent had no adverse ACRs, had received MACP benefits within the preceding five years, and had allegedly been assessed as fit for retention by the Screening Committee.

Whether the writ court could interfere with the Review Committee’s decision in the absence of perversity, arbitrariness, mala fides, or consideration of irrelevant material.

The Court applied Fundamental Rule 56(j) and Rule 48 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, which permit premature or compulsory retirement in public interest after consideration by the competent authority. It relied on CISF Circular No. 16/2015, which constituted separate screening and superannuation review committees for CISF personnel, including a three-member committee for Inspectors comprising the SDG/ADG (Headquarters), IG (Headquarters), and AIG (Establishment).

The Court held that premature-retirement review must ordinarily consider the entire service record, not merely ACRs, while giving appropriate weight to recent performance; this principle was drawn from Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha, State of Punjab v. Gurdas Singh, Pyare Mohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand, and Central Industrial Security Force v. HC (GD) Om Prakash. It further held that the “washed-off” theory applicable in promotion matters does not prevent consideration of earlier adverse material in compulsory-retirement proceedings, particularly where integrity, discipline, and suitability for continued service are assessed.

The Court also relied on Swapan Kumar Roy v. Union of India to distinguish career progression or MACP benefits from regular promotion for purposes of premature-retirement review.

The Court held that Appendix IX of the CCS (Pension) Rules, relied upon by the respondent, concerned civil employees and did not govern CISF personnel because CISF Circular No. 16/2015 specifically prescribed the competent Superannuation Review Committee for members of the Force. The committee comprising the AIG (Establishment), IG (Headquarters), and ADG (Headquarters) was therefore competent.

The Court rejected the argument that the respondent’s MACP benefit established his fitness for continued service, observing that MACP financial upgradation involved less stringent conditions than regular promotion and did not preclude consideration of prior punishments. The Review Committee was entitled to consider the respondent’s two major and five minor punishments, involving allegations of theft, threatening and derogatory conduct, absence from duty, and failure to respond appropriately to an injured constable, as relevant material concerning discipline and suitability in a uniformed force.

Since the order was based on the entire service record, and no perversity, arbitrariness, or mala fides was established, the writ court could not re-appreciate the merits of the Review Committee’s decision. The order signed by the DIG was treated as a communication of the decision already taken by the competent Review Committee and appointing authority, rather than an independent exercise of power by an incompetent officer.

Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed and the directions for reconsideration, reinstatement, arrears, and interest were set aside.