Claims for absorption are barred by gross delay and laches after prolonged non-service.

The three writ appeals arose from the same factual background and were heard and disposed of by a common order. Writ Appeal No. 42/2026 challenged the order dated 11 November 2025 in W.P. No. 6260/2021; W.A. No. 3225/2025 challenged the order dated 7 October 2025 in W.P. No. 59/2022; and W.A. No. 221/2026 challenged the order dated 17 December 2025 in W.P. No. 5329/2022.

The appellants sought, inter alia, quashing of the rejection orders and absorption of their services in the respondent school.

The appellants claimed that similarly situated persons had earlier been directed to submit representations, and that although their own representation remained pending, contempt proceedings were initiated. They contended that the pendency of those proceedings explained the delay in approaching the Court.

The State opposed the appeals, contending that the appellants had not worked since 1995, had acquiesced in the situation, and could not seek absorption after nearly thirty years.

The Division Bench found that the appellants had been out of service since 1995 and had been aware of the rejection of their representation at least since 2015. The rejection order dated 8 June 2015 had been placed on record in contempt proceedings filed on 7 July 2015. Despite this knowledge, the appellants did not challenge the order for several years, whereas similarly situated persons had challenged comparable orders in 2016.

Whether the writ petitions and consequential appeals were liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, when the appellants had knowledge of the rejection order since 2015 but approached the Court belatedly?

Whether the appellants could claim absorption in service after not having worked since 1995 and after a lapse of approximately thirty years?

Whether the orders of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petitions disclosed any ground for interference in writ appeal?

The Court applied the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, under which relief may be refused where a petitioner approaches the Court after unreasonable delay and laches.

Relying on State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436, particularly paragraph 54, the Court reiterated that a litigant cannot awaken from prolonged inaction and claim the benefit of relief obtained by diligent litigants in similar cases; subsequent knowledge of favourable judgments does not adequately explain delay.

The Court also relied on Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 356; State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya, (1996) 6 SCC 267; and Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538, which reject stale claims based on belated reliance on relief granted to others.

Further, relying on BSNL v. Ghanshyam Dass, (2011) 4 SCC 374, the Court accepted the principle that absorption cannot ordinarily be ordered after an extremely long period when the claimant has not remained in service.

The Court held that the appellants’ explanation based on the pending contempt proceedings did not cure the delay. The record showed that they knew of the adverse order dated 8 June 2015 by July 2015, yet failed to challenge it for several years, while similarly situated persons had approached the Court in 2016.

Applying the rule against stale claims under Article 226 and the principle in Mamata Mohanty, the Court refused to permit the appellants to obtain belated relief merely by relying on litigation pursued by more diligent persons.

Independently, the claim for absorption was found untenable because the appellants had not been in service since 1995 and had not worked for approximately thirty years. In light of this factual finding and the principle recognised in BSNL v. Ghanshyam Dass, the learned Single Judge’s refusal to direct absorption disclosed no error warranting appellate interference.

Finding no ground to interfere with the orders of the learned Single Judge, the Court dismissed Writ Appeal Nos. 42/2026, 3225/2025, and 221/2026.