Clear admissions of tenancy and rent justify a possession decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

The respondent-landlord instituted a suit for possession and mesne profits in respect of premises bearing No. 4405/2, Kothi No. 5, First Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi, claiming that the appellant-company had been inducted as a tenant at a monthly rent of ₹9,000 under a Rent/Lease Agreement dated 29 July 1986.

The appellant denied the alleged lease and asserted that it had entered the premises pursuant to an oral arrangement with the respondent’s husband, under which it was granted permanent or perpetual possession in consideration of substantial payments and the monthly amount of ₹9,000.

During the pendency of the suit, the respondent sought a decree for possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC on the basis of admissions in the written statement.

The Additional District Judge dismissed the appellant’s first appeal, holding that the relationship of landlord and tenant and payment of rent had been admitted, and that the alleged perpetual lease was legally unsustainable in the absence of a registered instrument.

The appellant thereafter preferred the present Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC.

1. Whether the appellant’s pleadings contained clear and sufficient admissions of its status as tenant, payment of rent, and the respondent’s right to seek possession so as to justify a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC?

2. Whether the appellant could resist eviction by relying on an alleged oral or unregistered agreement granting permanent or perpetual possession?

3. Whether the respondent’s title could be challenged by the appellant, and whether the alleged benami arrangement constituted a sustainable defence?

4. Whether the tenancy was validly terminated despite the appellant’s denial of service of the notice dated 7 August 2003?

5. Whether any substantial question of law arose for determination in the Regular Second Appeal?

The Court applied Order XII Rule 6 CPC, under which a decree may be passed on admissions contained in the pleadings where the material facts necessary for the relief are admitted.

It applied Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, embodying the tenant’s estoppel against denying the landlord’s title while retaining possession.

The Court relied on Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, read with the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to hold that a lease or arrangement creating a right of permanent possession or a term exceeding one year must be evidenced by a registered instrument; an alleged oral or unregistered perpetual tenancy could not create such an enforceable interest.

It further applied the principle under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act that institution of an eviction suit may itself operate as notice to quit, relying on M/s Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF), (2008) 2 SCC 728.

The scope of a Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC was also applied, requiring the existence of a substantial question of law before appellate interference.

The Court found that the appellant’s written statement expressly admitted that it had been inducted into the premises as a tenant and had regularly paid ₹9,000 per month as rent, even though it attempted to characterise the arrangement as one for permanent possession.

These admissions were sufficient to establish the landlord–tenant relationship and the respondent’s entitlement to seek possession.

The appellant’s denial of the specific written lease did not negate its own admission of tenancy and rent payment.

The alleged oral understanding for perpetual possession could not override the statutory requirement of a registered instrument and therefore did not constitute a legally enforceable defence.

The appellant’s challenge to the respondent’s ownership was also unavailable in view of tenant estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act; dealings, if any, with the respondent’s husband could not displace the respondent’s title or right to recover possession.

Even assuming that the termination notice had not been served, the filing of the eviction suit itself constituted notice to quit under the principle recognised in Nopany Investments.

Since mesne profits remained an evidentiary issue, their pendency did not prevent an immediate decree for possession on admitted facts.

Accordingly, no substantial question of law arose.

The alleged permanent or perpetual tenancy was unenforceable for want of a registered instrument, and the appellant was estopped from disputing the respondent’s title.

The eviction suit itself validly terminated the tenancy even assuming non-service of the prior notice.

Finding no substantial question of law, the Court dismissed the Regular Second Appeal and affirmed the decree for possession.

The claim for mesne profits remained subject to determination in the pending proceedings.