Co-accused disclosure statements and uncorroborated CDRs cannot alone justify framing conspiracy charges.

On secret information regarding an inter-State gang allegedly hired to murder the owner of Orient Taj Hotel and Resort, the police intercepted several accused persons travelling in a car, motorcycle and scooty on 29 April 2017.

Several firearms and cartridges were recovered, and two accused allegedly fired at police officers.

During investigation, co-accused Sanjay Kumar, Manish Khari and Chain Pal Gurjar made disclosure statements alleging that the petitioner had engaged the gang, through intermediaries, to murder the victim, who was the petitioner’s brother.

The petitioner was arrested on 22 July 2017 and later granted bail.

The Trial Court framed charges against him under Sections 120B read with 302 IPC, principally relying on the co-accused disclosure statements, Call Detail Records (CDRs), alleged communications among the accused, and surrounding circumstances.

The petitioner challenged the order on charge and the formal order framing charge under Sections 397/401 CrPC.

Whether charges under Sections 120B read with 302 IPC could be framed against the petitioner primarily on the basis of disclosure statements made by co-accused persons implicating him in the alleged conspiracy.

Whether the CDRs showing frequent communication between the petitioner and certain co-accused persons, without transcripts or other concrete corroborative material, were sufficient to establish a prima facie case or grave suspicion of criminal conspiracy.

Whether the material on record disclosed sufficient grounds to proceed against the petitioner under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC at the stage of consideration of charge.

At the stage of framing charge under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC, the court must determine whether the material, taken at its highest, discloses a prima facie case or gives rise to grave suspicion; it must not conduct a mini-trial or undertake a meticulous evaluation of the probative value of the evidence.

This principle was drawn from Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao and Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander.

Section 120B IPC concerns criminal conspiracy, while Section 302 IPC concerns murder.

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permits proof only of that portion of information supplied by an accused in police custody which relates distinctly to a fact discovered; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu explains that the “fact discovered” may extend beyond the physical object recovered, but the disclosure must nevertheless demonstrate the accused’s knowledge or mental awareness of the discovered fact.

A co-accused’s police disclosure statement, in the absence of legally admissible and corroborative material, cannot by itself establish the petitioner’s participation in the conspiracy.

The High Court found that the Trial Court had relied essentially on the disclosure statements of the co-accused, which alleged that the petitioner had given the murder contract, and on CDRs showing that he had communicated with Shambhu Sharma and other accused persons over an extended period.

However, no recovery was made from the petitioner or from any co-accused pursuant to information specifically connecting the petitioner with the alleged conspiracy.

The CDRs merely established the existence and frequency of calls; they contained no transcripts or recorded conversations demonstrating the subject matter or criminal purpose of the communications, and no FSL report provided additional corroboration.

The Court therefore held that ordinary or frequent communication, particularly with an admitted acquaintance, could not by itself constitute sufficient material to raise the requisite grave suspicion of a conspiracy to murder.

Applying the charge-framing principles under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC, the Court concluded that the material did not disclose a sufficient prima facie case against the petitioner.

The revision petition was allowed; the Trial Court’s order on charge dated 11 July 2018 and the formal order on charge dated 16 July 2018, insofar as they concerned the petitioner, were set aside.

The petition and pending application were disposed of accordingly.