Under FR 56(jj)(ii), specific court directions govern benefits after premature retirement is set aside.

The petitioner’s order of compulsory retirement had been set aside by the Delhi High Court in its judgment dated 28 October 2025. Since the petitioner had reached the age of superannuation, the Court directed deemed reinstatement from the date of compulsory retirement, notional fixation of pay and other consequential benefits, but expressly denied arrears of pay.

The petitioner sought review, contending that the Court had failed to consider Fundamental Rule 56(jj), under which the intervening period is to be treated as spent on duty for all purposes, including pay and allowances, when premature retirement is set aside by a court.

He also relied on the decision in South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Ranvir Singh & Anr., claiming that similarly situated employees had received back wages.

The respondent opposed the petition on the ground that the plea sought reconsideration on merits and fell outside the limited scope of review jurisdiction.

Whether the Court’s failure to expressly refer to Fundamental Rule 56(jj) constituted an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of the direction denying arrears of pay

Whether the relief granted in South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Ranvir Singh & Anr. required the petitioner to be granted arrears for the intervening period

Whether the review petition was, in substance, an appeal against the Court’s earlier exercise of discretion

The Court applied Fundamental Rule 56(jj)(i), which permits regulation of the period between premature retirement and reinstatement through leave, extraordinary leave or dies non, but requires the period to be treated as spent on duty for all purposes, including pay and allowances, where the premature retirement is held unjustified or is set aside by a court.

However, under FR 56(jj)(ii), where a court sets aside premature retirement and gives specific directions regarding regulation of the intervening period, that period must be regulated in accordance with the court’s directions.

The Court also applied the settled principle that review jurisdiction is limited and cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or for re-argument on the merits.

The Court held that the express omission of FR 56(jj) from the earlier judgment did not invalidate the direction concerning the intervening period.

The earlier judgment had specifically directed that the petitioner would receive deemed reinstatement, notional pay fixation and consequential benefits, but no arrears of pay; therefore, FR 56(jj)(ii) required the period to be regulated in accordance with that judicial direction.

The reliance on Ranvir Singh was also rejected because the Tribunal’s original order in that case had itself denied arrears of salary, and the High Court had merely dismissed the challenge to that order without independently applying FR 56(jj).

The petitioner’s request therefore sought a different assessment of the relief granted rather than correction of an error apparent on the face of the record, making the petition effectively appellate in nature.

It held that no reviewable error arose from the failure to mention FR 56(jj), because the Court had expressly regulated the intervening period by denying arrears while granting deemed reinstatement and notional benefits.

The comparison with Ranvir Singh did not justify modification of the relief.

Finding that the petition was an impermissible appeal in the guise of review, the Court dismissed Review Petition No. 574/2025 for lack of merit.