Specific court directions under FR 56(jj) govern intervening-period benefits, including exclusion of back wages.

The petitioner’s order of compulsory retirement had earlier been set aside by the Delhi High Court in its judgment dated 26 September 2025. Since the petitioner had attained the age of superannuation, the Court directed deemed reinstatement and notional fixation of pay and consequential benefits, but expressly denied arrears of pay.

The petitioner sought review, contending that the Court had failed to consider Fundamental Rule 56(jj), under which the intervening period is treated as spent on duty for all purposes, including pay and allowances, when premature retirement is set aside by a court.

He also relied on the decision in South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Ranvir Singh & Anr., where employees had allegedly received back wages for a portion of the relevant period.

The respondent opposed the review on the ground that the petition sought appellate reconsideration beyond the limited scope of review jurisdiction.

The Court condoned a delay of 116 days in filing the review petition.

Whether the Court’s failure to expressly refer to Fundamental Rule 56(jj) warranted review of the judgment dated 26 September 2025 and required grant of arrears of pay for the intervening period.

Whether the relief granted in South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Ranvir Singh & Anr. justified reviewing or modifying the petitioner’s entitlement to back wages.

Whether the petitioner’s challenge fell within the limited scope of review jurisdiction, or was in substance an appeal seeking reconsideration of the original judgment.

Fundamental Rule 56(jj)(i) provides that where premature retirement is set aside by a court, the intervening period is to be treated as spent on duty for all purposes, including pay and allowances, subject to the rule.

Rule 56(jj)(ii) specifically provides that where the court sets aside premature retirement with directions regarding regulation of the intervening period, that period must be regulated in accordance with the court’s directions.

The Court applied the principle that review jurisdiction is limited and cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal; mere omission to refer to a particular provision, where the court has consciously exercised its discretion and issued specific directions, does not by itself constitute a ground for review.

The Court held that Rule 56(jj)(ii) governed because its earlier judgment had specifically directed how the period between compulsory retirement and the judgment was to be regulated—by granting consequential benefits and notional pay fixation but excluding arrears of pay.

Accordingly, the Court’s failure to expressly mention Rule 56(jj) did not invalidate or undermine the discretion already exercised in the judgment.

The reliance on Ranvir Singh was also rejected because the Tribunal’s original order in that case had itself denied arrears of salary; the High Court merely dismissed the challenge to that order and did not subsequently apply Rule 56(jj) to grant back wages.

The petitioner’s request therefore sought a fresh assessment of the merits and modification of the relief, making it appellate in substance rather than a permissible review.

The reliance on Ranvir Singh was found distinguishable, and the review petition was held to be an impermissible appeal in the guise of review.

The delay of 116 days was condoned, but Review Petition No. 99/2026 was dismissed for lack of merit.