Commencement of limitation for cognizance begins from the date of knowledge of offence, not registration of FIR.

The Petitioner, a public servant, was subjected to a CBI search on 24.11.1995 in connection with an RC against his wife.

Documents seized suggested the Petitioner was running a private business, "M/s Jitendra Builders," in violation of service rules.

Based on intelligence and these documents, a Preliminary Enquiry (PE) was registered on 23.12.1996.

Investigation was permitted under Section 155(2) Cr.P.C. on 29.07.1997 because the alleged offence under Section 168 IPC is non-cognizable.

The CBI filed a chargesheet on 28.07.1998 for Section 168 IPC, along with an application to condone a purported 1.5-month delay.

The Trial Court condoned the delay multiple times, leading to several rounds of litigation, including a remand by the Supreme Court.

The Petitioner challenged the latest order dated 12.04.2004, which condoned the delay and took cognizance under Sections 168 and 419 IPC.

Whether the period of limitation for filing the chargesheet commenced from the date of the search/seizure of documents or the date of registration of the RC.

Whether the delay in filing the chargesheet was adequately explained to warrant condonation under Section 473 Cr.P.C.

Whether the prosecution could invoke Section 419 IPC at a later stage solely to circumvent the barred limitation period for Section 168 IPC.

The court primarily applied Section 468 Cr.P.C., which mandates a one-year limitation for offences punishable by imprisonment up to one year, such as Section 168 IPC.

It relied on Section 469 Cr.P.C. to determine the commencement of limitation, specifically noting that the period begins on the day the offence/offender comes to the knowledge of the police officer.

The court also examined Section 155(2) Cr.P.C. regarding the investigation of non-cognizable cases and the principles for condonation of delay under Section 473 Cr.P.C.

The Court found that the CBI had knowledge of the alleged offence as early as 24.11.1995 (search date) or at the latest by 01.02.1996 (bank document collection), making the 28.07.1998 filing delayed by over two years rather than the 1.5 months claimed.

The court rejected the CBI’s argument that the delay was due to waiting for a CFSL Report, stating that such reports are corroborative and do not prevent the filing of a chargesheet when the documents themselves disclosed the offence.

Regarding the addition of Section 419 IPC (cheating by personation), the court observed that no supplementary chargesheet was filed and there was no evidence that "Jitender Singh" was a non-existent person or a fake name used by the Petitioner.

The court concluded that the application for Section 419 IPC was a strategic move by the CBI to bypass the limitation bar of Section 168 IPC.

It held that the CBI failed to provide a cogent explanation for the delay of over two years.

Consequently, the Court set aside the Trial Court's order dated 12.04.2004, quashed the chargesheet as being barred by time, and allowed the Revision Petition.