Compassionate appointment may exclude adopted children where applicable personal law does not recognize adoption.

The applicant claimed to be the adopted son of Bashir Ahmad Teeli, an Assistant Lineman in the Public Health Engineering Department who died in harness on 13 July 2010.

The applicant relied on a Will, adoption-related documents, revenue records, a dependency certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Anantnag, and a succession certificate describing or recognizing him as the deceased’s adopted son and dependent.

He sought compassionate appointment under SRO-43 of 1994.

Although his case was processed and forwarded by the departmental authorities, it was rejected by communication dated 24 July 2017 on the ground that adoption was not recognized under Muslim Personal Law and that he was therefore not covered by the compassionate appointment scheme.

The applicant challenged the rejection and also questioned SRO-177 dated 20 June 2014, which amended the definition of “family member” under SRO-43 by recognizing an adopted son or daughter only where adoption was permissible under the applicable law.

He contended that his claim had accrued when the unamended SRO-43 was in force and that applying SRO-177 to his pending claim was impermissibly retrospective and discriminatory.

The respondents relied on the amended provision, its Explanation applying it to pending cases, and decisions including Mohammad Rafiq Wagay v. State of J&K and Mohammad Yousuf Khanday v. Department of Power Development .

1. Whether SRO-177 dated 20 June 2014, insofar as it recognizes an adopted son or daughter only in communities where adoption is legally permissible, is arbitrary, discriminatory, unconstitutional, or otherwise invalid under Article 14 of the Constitution?

2. Whether the amended provision could be applied to the applicant’s pending claim, despite the death of the employee and the applicant’s application having occurred before SRO-177 came into force?

3. Whether the applicant was a legally recognized adopted son and “family member” under SRO-43 of 1994, as amended by SRO-177, and whether the rejection of his claim for compassionate appointment was liable to be set aside?

Compassionate appointment is an exception to the ordinary rule of public recruitment and is not a hereditary, vested, or enforceable right; eligibility must be determined strictly under the governing scheme.

Under the original SRO-43 of 1994, “family member” included an adopted son or daughter, but SRO-177 dated 20 June 2014 qualified that inclusion by requiring adoption to be permissible under the law applicable to the concerned community.

The Explanation to SRO-177 expressly directed that pending cases be decided under the amended notification where the candidate had applied within one year of the employee’s death.

The Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007 was treated as governing the applicant’s personal-law status, under which guardianship or care does not ordinarily create the legal filiation and inheritance rights of a natural-born child.

Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object of the scheme; recognition of legally valid familial relationships was held to satisfy that test.

The Tribunal also relied on State Bank of India v. Raj Kumar , (2010) 11 SCC 661, and Canara Bank v. Mahesh Kumar , (2015) 7 SCC 412, for the principle that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed dehors the governing scheme.

The Tribunal also relied on Mohammad Rafiq Wagay v. State of J&K for the specific proposition that an adopted son from a community whose personal law does not recognize adoption cannot claim appointment under SRO-43.

The Tribunal held that the applicant’s description in official records, dependency certificate, adoption deed, Will, and succession certificate established that he had been brought up and administratively treated as the deceased’s dependent, but did not establish a legally recognized adoption for purposes of the compassionate-appointment scheme.

Since the applicant was Muslim and did not show that adoption was recognized under his personal law, by a binding custom, or through an applicable statutory mechanism, he did not qualify as an “adopted son” under the amended SRO-43.

His claim was pending when SRO-177 came into force, and the Explanation expressly made the amendment applicable to pending cases where the application had been filed within one year of death; the applicant satisfied that temporal condition.

The Tribunal rejected the vested-right argument because death of the employee and submission of an application created, at most, a right to consideration under the applicable scheme, not an indefeasible right to appointment.

It further held that SRO-177 was based on the legal status of the claimed relationship, not religion as such, and that the distinction was rationally connected to the need for certainty and uniformity in administering an exceptional employment concession.

The Will, succession certificate, and prior departmental processing could not override the statutory eligibility requirements.

It further held that the applicant was not a legally recognized adopted son or “family member” under SRO-43 of 1994 as amended, and that the communication dated 24 July 2017 rejecting his compassionate-appointment claim did not warrant interference.

The Transfer Application was accordingly dismissed, all connected miscellaneous applications were disposed of, and there was no order as to costs.