Concurrent findings affirming self-acquired status and prior partition of property preclude interference in second appeal.

The legal heirs of the original plaintiff, Kheman Bai, challenged the concurrent dismissal of her suit for declaration of title and partition of 4.10 acres of land situated in Village Mopka

The plaintiff, along with defendants No. 9 to 11, were the daughters of late Bhondu, while defendants No. 1 to 3 and late Mohanlal were his sons

The plaintiff alleged that following Bhondu’s death on 30.06.1991, the suit land devolved upon all legal heirs, and she was entitled to a 1/8th share under the Hindu Succession Act

The defendants contended that the property was the self-acquired land of Bhondu, who had already executed partition deeds in 1979 and 1989, distributing the property exclusively among his sons during his lifetime

Consequently, mutation was recorded in favor of the sons in 1980 and 1990

Both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court dismissed the suit, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove the property was ancestral and that the lifetime partition was valid

1. Whether the suit property was ancestral in nature or the self-acquired property of late Bhondu

2. Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a 1/8th share in the suit land despite the partition effected by the father during his lifetime

3. Whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts could be interfered with in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC in the absence of a substantial question of law

The court primarily applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which restricts the scope of a Second Appeal to cases involving a "substantial question of law"

It relied on the principle that concurrent findings of fact are binding unless shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled legal principles

The court further cited the precedent of State of Rajasthan and others v. Shiv Dayal and another (2019) 8 SCC 637, which establishes that concurrent findings of fact can only be assailed if they are de hors the pleadings, based on a misreading of material evidence, or are judicially unreasonable

Additionally, the court considered the evidentiary requirements for establishing the "ancestral" nature of property versus "self-acquired" property under the Hindu Succession Act

The Court observed that the plaintiffs failed to specifically plead that the suit property was ancestral or lay any foundation for how the property devolved upon Bhondu as ancestral land

In the absence of such pleadings and cogent evidence, the Court upheld the Trial Court's finding that the land was Bhondu’s self-acquired property

Applying the Rule of Law regarding lifetime partitions, the Court noted that Bhondu had the right to distribute his self-acquired property among his sons, a fact supported by the mutation records from 1980 and 1990

The Court emphasized that the scope of interference under Section 100 CPC is extremely narrow; since the appellants failed to demonstrate any perversity or misapplication of law in the lower courts' findings, the issues raised were essentially questions of fact rather than law

There was no evidence of misreading of documents or findings that no reasonable judge could reach

The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a right to partition as the property was self-acquired and had been legally partitioned by the father during his lifetime

The Court further held that the challenge to concurrent findings of fact did not satisfy the "substantial question of law" requirement under Section 100 of the CPC

No relief was granted to the appellants