Concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed in second appeal absent perversity or a substantial question of law.

The appellant-plaintiff instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 227 of 2011 seeking a declaration that he was in actual and physical possession of Survey No. 57/3, admeasuring 8,094 sq. mtrs., at Village Ramnagar, Anand, and a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with that possession.

The defendants denied the plaintiff’s right, title, interest and possession over the land.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit on 22 November 2018, holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove possession. The First Appellate Court dismissed Regular Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2019 and confirmed the decree on 23 March 2026.

In the second appeal, the plaintiff contended that he possessed at least one vigha of the land as an agricultural tenant and that the defendants had forcibly dispossessed him during the pendency of the suit.

However, the plaintiff’s affidavit dated 5 January 2011, marked Exhibit 66, recorded that he had handed over peaceful and vacant possession of the suit land to the defendants, except one vigha.

Whether the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court that the plaintiff failed to prove his title and possession disclosed a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the CPC.

Whether the plaintiff was entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of alleged possession as an agricultural tenant, despite the absence of evidence establishing such tenancy and the admission in Exhibit 66 regarding delivery of possession.

Whether the plaintiff was entitled to protection against alleged forcible dispossession during the pendency of the suit.

The Court applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, under which a second appeal lies only on a substantial question of law and does not ordinarily permit reappreciation of concurrent findings of fact.

Relying on Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 555, the Court held that concurrent factual findings cannot be disturbed unless they are perverse, grossly erroneous, or contrary to settled legal principles.

The Court also relied on Maria Margadia Sequeria v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (D), (2012) 5 SCC 370, for the principle that injunction cannot ordinarily be granted in favour of a trespasser, a person in wrongful possession, or a permissive user against the true owner.

A party seeking possession-based injunctive relief must establish lawful or legally protected possession over the property described in the plaint.

The High Court found no perversity or egregious legal error in the concurrent findings of the courts below.

The plaintiff admittedly had no title, and although he claimed possession under an agricultural tenancy, he produced no evidence substantiating that tenancy.

More importantly, Exhibit 66 contradicted his pleaded case of possession over the entire 8,094 sq. mtrs., since it recorded delivery of possession to the defendants except for one vigha.

The plaintiff had not sought any specific relief concerning that one-vigha portion and had not amended or otherwise established a legally enforceable claim to it.

His allegation that the defendants subsequently dispossessed him during the suit was also rejected because no application for status quo ante or other appropriate relief had been filed before either court, and the prior admission in Exhibit 66 undermined the allegation of forcible dispossession.

Since the plaintiff failed to prove title, tenancy, or legally protected possession, the rule in Maria Margadia Sequeria barred the grant of an injunction against the title-holding defendants.

The Second Appeal was dismissed, the judgment and decree dated 23 March 2026 affirming dismissal of the suit were maintained, and the connected Civil Application for stay was disposed of. No order as to costs was made.