Consent by Married Woman Under Promise of Marriage Involving Disputed Facts Requires Trial Adjudication

The petitioner, a Gram Sarpanch and father of six, challenged an FIR (No. 637/2025) and subsequent charge-sheet filed under Sections 64(2)(m) and 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.

The complainant, a 30-year-old married woman and mother of five living separately from her husband, alleged that the petitioner established physical relations with her between March and November 2025 based on a promise of marriage, which he later rescinded.

The petitioner sought quashing of the proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC), arguing the relationship was consensual and a promise of marriage was legally impossible given both parties' subsisting marriages.

1. Whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed on the grounds that the relationship was consensual and the victim was aware of the legal impossibility of marriage.

2. Whether the High Court, in exercising its inherent jurisdiction, can adjudicate disputed questions of fact regarding the intent behind a promise of marriage after a charge-sheet has been filed.

The Court applied the settled principles of quashing under State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which mandate that inherent powers be used sparingly and only when allegations, taken at face value, disclose no cognizable offence.

It referenced Section 64(2)(m) and Section 69 of the BNS, 2023, regarding sexual intercourse by deceitful means or false promise of marriage.

It further distinguished the precedent Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh (2026 INSC 124), noting that while a promise of marriage to a married person may mitigate a claim of "misconception of fact" under certain conditions, each case depends on its specific factual matrix and the nature of the inducement.

The Court reasoned that unlike the *Pramod Kumar Navratna* case, where the complainant was an advocate involved in active divorce litigation, the present victim’s marital status and the petitioner's intent required a factual inquiry.

The Court observed that the complaint detailed a prolonged course of conduct where the petitioner allegedly used the promise of marriage to maintain a relationship.

It held that whether the petitioner had a "dishonest intention from the inception" or if the consent was vitiated by a misconception of fact are "essentially questions of fact" that cannot be determined in a quashing petition.

Since the police had already filed a charge-sheet based on the victim's statement and collected material, the Court found prima facie evidence of a cognizable offence.

It held that once a charge-sheet is filed and allegations prima facie disclose an offence, the High Court cannot conduct a "roving enquiry" or meticulously evaluate evidence, as such matters fall within the exclusive domain of the trial Court.

The petitioner was granted liberty to raise all defences during the trial or at the stage of discharge.