Consistent victim testimony and corroboration sustain conviction for house-trespass and outraging modesty.

On 26 October 2014, at approximately 6:20 p.m., the victim was cooking inside her house when the appellant, Jagannath Sahu, allegedly entered the premises, removed his clothes, and touched her hand and breasts.

On her raising an alarm, her aunt-in-law and grandmother-in-law arrived and saw the appellant leaving the house in a naked condition.

The victim lodged the FIR the same evening at about 8:00 p.m. alleging offences under Sections 456 and 354-A of the IPC against the appellant and co-accused Rajendra Barle.

After investigation, the appellant was charged under Sections 451 and 354 of the IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST Act; the co-accused was charged under Section 451 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

The prosecution examined four witnesses, while the defence examined one witness and alleged a false implication arising from a monetary dispute between the appellant and the victim’s husband.

The trial court acquitted the co-accused and convicted the appellant under Sections 451 and 354 of the IPC, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for one year with fine under each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.

The appellant challenged the conviction under Section 374(2) of the CrPC.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed house-trespass under Section 451 of the IPC with the intention of committing an offence therein?

Whether the evidence established that the appellant assaulted or used criminal force against the victim with the intention of outraging her modesty, thereby attracting Section 354 of the IPC?

Whether the alleged contradictions, absence of independent witnesses, acquittal of the co-accused, and the defence of a monetary dispute created a reasonable doubt warranting acquittal of the appellant?

The Court applied Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, governing appeals against conviction by the High Court.

Section 451 of the IPC penalises house-trespass or house-breaking committed in order to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment, while Section 354 of the IPC applies where assault or criminal force is used against a woman with the intent to outrage, or knowledge that it is likely to outrage, her modesty.

The Court applied the evidentiary principles that the testimony of the victim may sustain a conviction where it is consistent, credible, and corroborated by surrounding circumstances; minor discrepancies or omissions do not undermine otherwise reliable evidence.

The prosecution nevertheless bears the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and a defence based on motive for false implication must be supported by credible material.

The Court found the victim’s testimony consistent with her prompt FIR: she specifically stated that the appellant entered her house, removed his clothes, and touched her, and that her aunt-in-law and grandmother-in-law arrived when she raised an alarm.

PW-2 corroborated the material circumstances by stating that she saw the appellant emerging from the victim’s house in a naked condition after hearing the victim’s cries.

The Court held that these facts established both the appellant’s unauthorised entry with the requisite criminal intent under Section 451 and his use of criminal force and conduct intended to outrage the victim’s modesty under Section 354.

The absence of further independent witnesses did not discredit the prosecution case, particularly because the victim remained firm in cross-examination and her account was supported by PW-2 and the contemporaneous FIR.

The acquittal of the co-accused was not inconsistent with the appellant’s conviction because the evidence attributed a distinct role to the co-accused, namely standing outside the house, whereas the appellant was identified as the person who entered the house and committed the offending acts.

The alleged monetary dispute was not established sufficiently by the defence witness, who admitted that he had not witnessed any money transaction between the parties.

The Court found no material contradiction, perversity, or illegality in the trial court’s judgment and dismissed the appeal.

As the appellant was on bail, he was directed to surrender before the concerned trial court within four weeks to serve the sentence; failing surrender, the trial court was directed to take him into custody for execution of the sentence.