Conviction cannot stand where material investigative and medical omissions create reasonable doubt.

On 30 May 1993 at approximately 10:30 p.m., Suresh Yadav was allegedly assaulted near the boring machine in his field by a group of persons armed with bhalas and lathis, allegedly intending to commit theft of the boring machine.

Suresh was taken to hospitals at Sikandra, Mokama and subsequently Patna, where he died during treatment. The informant’s fardbeyan was recorded on 3 June 1993, and Halsi P.S. Case No. 47 of 1993 was registered under Sections 382 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The trial court framed charges under Sections 302/34 and 382 IPC and, by judgment dated 16 May 2018, convicted the accused under Section 302/34 IPC, sentencing each to life imprisonment and fine.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants participated in the assault causing the death of Suresh Yadav, thereby attracting liability under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

Whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the discrepancy between the date of the inquest and the FIR, and the non-examination of the Investigating Officer and doctor rendered the prosecution case unreliable.

Whether the contradictions among the prosecution witnesses and the absence of medical and investigative evidence entitled the appellants to the benefit of doubt.

The Court applied Section 302 IPC concerning punishment for murder and Section 34 IPC concerning acts done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention; the prosecution was required to establish the appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court relied on the principle in Pankaj v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 192, that where the genesis and manner of occurrence are doubtful and the prosecution evidence lacks quality and credibility, conviction cannot safely be sustained and the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

It also relied on Munna Lal v. State of U.P., (2023) 18 SCC 661, for the principle that non-examination of the Investigating Officer, where his evidence is material to the case, may create a substantial lacuna and reasonable doubt in the prosecution case.

The Court further treated the absence of the doctor and post-mortem report as significant where medical evidence was necessary to establish the nature of the injuries, cause of death and nexus between the alleged assault and death.

The Court found that PW-1 and PW-2 were hearsay witnesses and that PW-3 had not witnessed the assault or identified the assailants at the place of occurrence.

Although PW-4 claimed to be an eyewitness and attributed specific assaults to the accused, his version materially conflicted with PW-5’s statement that he reached the scene first and that PW-4 arrived approximately ten minutes later.

The prosecution neither satisfactorily explained the delay in lodging the FIR nor reconciled the fact that the inquest report was prepared at NMCH, Patna, on 31 May 1993—before the FIR was lodged at Halsi on 3 June 1993.

The non-examination of the Investigating Officer deprived the defence of an opportunity to confront witnesses with omissions and contradictions, while the absence of the doctor and post-mortem report left the cause of death, nature of injuries and connection with the alleged assault unproved by reliable medical evidence.

In view of these cumulative deficiencies, the Court held that the prosecution evidence was insufficiently reliable to sustain a conviction for murder.

The conviction dated 16 May 2018 and sentence dated 22 May 2018 under Section 302/34 IPC were set aside as unsustainable.

The appeal was allowed, the appellants were acquitted of all charges, and they were directed to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.