Conviction for completed offence is unsustainable when the accused is specifically charged only with attempt.

On July 10, 2014, the appellant allegedly took the victim (PW12), a 4½-year-old girl, into his grocery shop, removed her underwear, climbed onto her back, and "poured water" (semen) on her

Based on the mother’s (PW11) statement, an FIR was registered

The Trial Court framed charges under Section 9(m) read with Sections 10 and 18 of the POCSO Act (attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault)

Following the prosecution's evidence, the Trial Court convicted the appellant for the substantive offence of aggravated sexual assault under Section 9(m) punishable under Section 10, sentencing him to five years of rigorous imprisonment

The appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of lack of physical injuries, potential tutoring of the child witness, an alleged financial dispute with the victim's family, and the legal error of convicting for a completed offence despite being charged only with an "attempt"

The court applied Section 374(2) of the CrPC regarding criminal appeals

Regarding procedural lapses, it relied on Moidu K. vs. State of Kerala, holding that non-compliance with Section 232 CrPC only vitiates proceedings if substantial prejudice is shown

For witness credibility, it applied Ganesan v. State, establishing that the credible testimony of a sexual assault victim requires no corroboration

Substantively, the court interpreted Sections 7 (Sexual Assault), 9(m) (Aggravated Sexual Assault on children under 12), 10 (Punishment), and 18 (Attempt) of the POCSO Act, noting that Section 18 limits punishment for an attempt to one-half of the longest term provided for the substantive offence

The High Court found the victim's testimony (PW12) credible, noting it remained consistent with her Section 164 statement and was corroborated by her mother's prompt FIS/FIR

The court dismissed the defense regarding the absence of injuries, noting the charge did not involve penetration

It further rejected the "financial dispute" theory due to inconsistent versions provided by the defense during cross-examinations and the Section 313 statement

However, the court found a significant legal error in the Trial Court's judgment: while the accused was charged with "attempt" under Section 18, he was convicted for the completed offence under Section 9(m) without an amendment to the charge

Since the appellant was never charged with the completed act, the conviction was restricted to "attempt"

Consequently, applying Section 18, the court determined that the maximum sentence permissible is half of the longest term for the offence (7 years under Section 10), which is 3.5 years

The court held that the Trial Court's sentence of five years exceeded the legal limit for an attempt

Accordingly, the substantive sentence was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of three and a half years