Correction of date of birth in service record cannot be sought at the verge of retirement.

The petitioner was appointed as a Junior Engineer with Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. (DGVCL) on July 16, 2001.

At the time of entry, her date of birth was recorded as June 1, 1966, based on her School Leaving Certificate.

Based on this record, she was scheduled for superannuation on June 30, 2026.

On November 3, 2025—approximately eight months before retirement—the petitioner applied for a correction of her birth date to June 1, 1968, citing her Birth Certificate and PAN card.

DGVCL rejected the request on June 10, 2026.

The petitioner challenged this rejection under Article 226 of the Constitution, alleging violation of natural justice and citing her tribal background as the reason for the delay in seeking correction.

1. Whether an employee can seek correction of their date of birth in the service record at the "fag end" of their career after twenty-five years of service.

2. Whether the rejection of the application without an oral hearing constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice sufficient to warrant interference.

The Court applied the settled principle of service jurisprudence that date of birth corrections cannot be entertained at the verge of retirement to avoid unsettling settled service conditions.

It relied on Establishment Circular No. 623 of the DGVCL, which prescribes a mandatory two-year window from the date of appointment for seeking such corrections.

The Court followed the precedent set in Dharmeshkumar Jitendrabhai Joshi v. State of Gujarat (SCA No. 5952 of 2025), which incorporated the Supreme Court’s rulings in General Manager, M/s Barsua Iron Ore Mines v. Vice President United Mines Mazdoor Union (2024) and Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited v. T.P. Nataraja (2021), establishing that even with cogent evidence, correction is not a matter of right and can be rejected on grounds of delay and laches.

The Court observed that the petitioner accepted her recorded date of birth for nearly twenty-five years without demur.

It found her explanation for the delay—unawareness of legal rights—implausible for a professional serving as a Junior Engineer.

The Court reasoned that permitting such alterations at the concluding stage of service would cause serious administrative consequences and "unsettle settled service conditions".

On the issue of natural justice, the Court agreed with the respondents that since the petitioner had already retired by the time of the hearing (June 30, 2026), remanding the matter for a hearing would be a "wholly futile" exercise.

The High Court found no illegality or jurisdictional error in the respondent's order. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the Rule was discharged. No order as to costs was made.