Courts granting probation must consider whether default imprisonment for unpaid fines defeats probation’s purpose.

The appellant was convicted under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The trial court released him on probation for two years upon his furnishing a surety bond of ₹25,000, but also directed him to pay a fine equal to three times the electricity-theft bill, with one year’s simple imprisonment in default.

The appellant did not challenge the conviction on merits; he challenged the fine and default-imprisonment order, arguing that it was inconsistent with the benefit of probation.

Whether the order imposing a fine with imprisonment in default, despite releasing the appellant on probation, required reconsideration in light of Ishar Das.

Whether the appeal should be remanded for the trial court to reconsider the sentencing order after hearing both sides.

Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003, was the basis of the appellant’s conviction.

The appeal was brought under Section 415 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

The Court relied on Ishar Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 1295, where the Supreme Court explained that imposing a fine that entails imprisonment upon default may defeat the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958’s objective of avoiding imprisonment for persons granted probation; the decision also considered the benefit under Section 4 of that Act.

The High Court directed the trial court to reconsider the matter in light of that precedent, without deciding the merits itself.

The appellant’s challenge concerned the consequence of default in paying the fine, not the merits of his conviction.

Because the trial court had granted probation but also imposed a fine carrying a term of imprisonment in default, the High Court considered the principle in Ishar Das relevant to the sentencing issue.

As the trial court had not been directed to that decision at the sentencing stage, the High Court remitted the matter for fresh consideration and hearing of both sides rather than deciding the issue itself.

It expressly stated that it had not considered the merits of the case.

The application for suspension of sentence was disposed of as no longer surviving in light of the order in the appeal.