Courts must defer nomination challenges that would interrupt ongoing election proceedings.

The fifth respondent filed a nomination for the bye-election to the Nandigram Assembly Constituency, accompanied by a Form 26 affidavit stating her age as “60+ years” and that she had passed Class X in 1965.

The petitioners alleged that these declarations were inconsistent and sought, among other reliefs, verification of the educational records and a determination of the consequences under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

The nomination was scrutinised and accepted on 17 September 2026, without an objection from the petitioners at scrutiny; a complaint was made on 21 September 2026, after scrutiny had concluded.

At the hearing, the petitioners confined their challenge to the Returning Officer’s failure to examine the discrepancy and exercise powers concerning the nomination.

1. Whether the High Court could examine the Returning Officer’s acceptance of the fifth respondent’s nomination, on the alleged discrepancy in her Form 26 affidavit, while the election process was ongoing.

2. Whether the alleged inconsistency between the fifth respondent’s declared age and year of passing Class X required verification or rejection of the nomination under Section 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Section 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 empowers the Returning Officer to examine nominations and decide objections, including on the officer’s own motion, but prohibits rejection for a defect that is not of a substantial character.

Article 329(b) bars an election from being called in question except by an election petition; the term “election” encompasses the process from notification through declaration of results.

Under Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar, judicial intervention during an ongoing election is limited: it may be available where it facilitates or preserves the election process, but courts must avoid interrupting, obstructing, delaying, or protracting it.

Section 100(1)(d)(i) provides for an election to be declared void where improper acceptance of a nomination materially affected the result.

The nomination had already been accepted after scrutiny, and the petitioners had not objected at that stage; their later complaint came after the scrutiny process was complete.

Although the petitioners framed their claim as one concerning the Returning Officer’s failure to act, deciding whether the affidavit contained a substantial defect would require examination of the nomination and its supporting evidence.

The Court considered that intervention at this point would directly affect the ongoing election, rather than merely facilitate its progress.

The Court therefore left the alleged discrepancy and its consequences to be raised at the appropriate stage in an election petition.

The dismissal does not prevent the petitioners from raising the issue in an election petition at the appropriate stage.