Criminal acquittal does not automatically exonerate an employee in departmental proceedings.

In 1993, the appellant received a penalty of censure for negligence concerning missing OL-series draft forms at the Bansda branch, which he accepted.

In 1994, the Bank initiated a separate disciplinary proceeding alleging that he had fraudulently used a missing draft for ₹30,000.

The inquiry officer found the charge proved, relying in part on handwriting-expert evidence connecting the appellant to the draft and to an account-introduction form associated with the transaction.

The disciplinary authority dismissed him in 1998; the appellate authority upheld the dismissal, and the Single Judge dismissed his writ petition.

In the Letters Patent Appeal, the appellant relied, among other things, on his acquittal in the criminal case and challenged the sufficiency and credibility of the departmental evidence.

Whether the appellant’s acquittal in the criminal proceedings required his exoneration in the departmental inquiry concerning the same transaction.

Whether the departmental finding of guilt was supported by sufficient evidence, including the handwriting-expert opinion, notwithstanding the dispute over whether the draft forms had been received at the Bansda branch.

Whether the disciplinary findings warranted interference in writ or Letters Patent Appeal jurisdiction.

A criminal acquittal does not automatically exonerate an employee in departmental proceedings: criminal guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas departmental charges are determined on the balance of probabilities.

In judicial review of disciplinary proceedings, interference is limited; where adequate evidence supports the disciplinary finding, the reviewing court does not reappreciate that evidence as an appellate fact-finder.

The judgment cites no specific statute or precedent.

The Court rejected the argument that the criminal acquittal controlled the departmental outcome because the two proceedings apply different standards of proof.

It found that the draft resurfaced and was encashed while the appellant was posted at the Prabhat Society branch, and that the purported signature of V.B. Barot on the draft was attributed by the handwriting expert to the appellant; the Court also relied on the appellant’s handwriting on the account-introduction form connected with the account receiving the proceeds.

Those circumstances, in the Court’s view, sufficiently connected the appellant to the fraudulent encashment.

Even assuming the Bank had not established receipt of the draft forms at Bansda, the evidence concerning the forged signature and account-introduction form supported the finding of involvement.

The Court therefore found no basis for appellate interference with the concurrent disciplinary findings.

It dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal.