Death during appeal does not nullify a disciplinary punishment imposed during the employee’s lifetime.

The petitioner, son and legal heir of late Shri M.S. Cheema, challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution the punishment order dated 06.07.2005, the appellate order dated 20.07.2010, and the revisional order dated 16.08.2012.

Cheema, who had served as a Branch Officer with Markfed and retired on 31.12.2004, was proceeded against for shortage of paddy stocks of crop year 1997–98 stored at M/s N.G.T. Rice Mill, Banur.

The enquiry did not establish that Cheema had misappropriated or personally benefited from the paddy, but found negligence in safeguarding stocks.

The disciplinary authority consequently reduced him by two stages in the time scale of pay for calculating retiral dues and directed that the loss relating to stocks in joint custody would be recovered from the charged officials in equal proportion if it could not be recovered from the miller through arbitration or legal proceedings.

Markfed independently initiated criminal, arbitration and civil recovery proceedings against the miller.

An arbitral award was initially passed in Markfed’s favour, but was later set aside, after which Markfed determined its claim and instituted a recovery suit against the miller.

Cheema died on 26.09.2009 while his departmental appeal was pending.

The petitioner contended that the proceedings should have abated under Markfed’s resolution dated 29.09.1989 and that recovery from Cheema’s estate was premature.

The respondents maintained that the punishment had already been imposed during Cheema’s lifetime and was therefore not invalidated by his subsequent death.

The Court applied the principles governing judicial review of disciplinary action under Article 226, including the rule that a disciplinary authority may punish the misconduct actually proved, even if a more serious allegation such as misappropriation is not established.

It further applied the principle of proportionality in examining whether the penalty was wholly disproportionate to the proved misconduct.

Relying on Bitola Devi v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 7717 of 2019, decided on 30.09.2019, the Court held that a rule or circular providing for closure of disciplinary proceedings upon the employee’s death applies where proceedings are still pending without a concluded finding and punishment; it does not ordinarily apply where the enquiry has concluded and punishment has already been imposed during the employee’s lifetime, even if an appeal or revision remains pending.

The Court also interpreted the resolution dated 29.09.1989 as distinguishing between pending disciplinary proceedings and recovery orders already passed during the employee’s lifetime, the latter permitting recovery from dues or through other legal remedies.

The Court held that the failure to prove personal misappropriation did not erase the separate finding that Cheema had negligently performed his duties and thereby enabled the miller to unauthorisedly convert the stocks.

The penalty of reduction by two stages, limited to the calculation of retiral dues, was not considered wholly disproportionate to the substantial shortage valued at approximately Rs. 26 lakhs; nor had Cheema been directed to bear the entire loss immediately, since recovery concerning joint-custody stocks was expressly made conditional upon failure to recover the amount from the miller through legal proceedings.

Since the punishment order had been passed on 06.07.2005, nearly four years before Cheema’s death on 26.09.2009, the disciplinary proceedings had already culminated during his lifetime.

Applying Bitola Devi, the Court found that the pending appeal did not extinguish the punishment or prevent appellate consideration of its legality.

The resolution dated 29.09.1989 likewise did not assist the petitioner because it permitted continuation of recovery where an order had already been passed during the employee’s lifetime.

It held that the punishment for proved negligence was legally sustainable and that Cheema’s subsequent death during the pendency of the appeal did not invalidate the punishment or the consequential recovery mechanism.

The challenge to the orders dated 06.07.2005, 20.07.2010 and 16.08.2012 was dismissed, and the petitioner was not granted the requested direction for release of pensionary benefits free from the impugned punishment.

Any pending applications were also disposed of.