Defamation complaints cannot be referred to police for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC.

Respondent No. 2 filed a private complaint alleging that the petitioners published newspaper notices accusing her of creating false documents, cheating officials and attempting to alienate disputed properties, thereby harming her reputation.

The allegations arose amid pending civil litigation concerning the properties.

The Magistrate referred the complaint to police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.; the police investigated and filed a charge-sheet for offences under Sections 426, 427 and 500 read with Section 34 IPC.

The Magistrate took cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C.

The petitioners sought to quash the proceedings, contending, among other things, that a defamation complaint should not have been referred for police investigation.

1. Whether the Magistrate erred in referring the private complaint, which included an offence of defamation, to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

2. Whether the subsequent police investigation, charge-sheet and taking of cognizance were sustainable in the circumstances.

The Court considered Sections 156(3), 190(1)(b) and 200 Cr.P.C., and offences under Sections 426, 427 and 500 read with Section 34 IPC.

It held that, in a defamation complaint, the Magistrate should consider the complaint and, if proceeding, take cognizance and record the complainant’s sworn statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C., rather than refer the matter to police for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

The Court also relied on Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221, and Suresh v. Sub-Inspector of Police, (2019) 4 KLT 106, as well as its decision in Crl.P. No. 675/2020.

The complaint alleged defamation through newspaper publications, but the Magistrate referred it to the police without first following the complaint procedure under Section 200 Cr.P.C.

The police then investigated and filed a charge-sheet despite the nature of the offences alleged.

The Magistrate’s later order merely recorded that the charge-sheet had been perused and took cognizance, without addressing whether its material disclosed a prima facie case against the petitioners.

The Court treated these defects as fundamental and held that the referral and ensuing cognizance could not stand.

The order referring the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the taking of cognizance on the investigation report in C.C. No. 449/2019 were quashed.

The Magistrate was directed to resume proceedings from the stage of registration of the complaint and proceed in accordance with law.