Delay may be condoned where counsel’s actions substantially contributed to the litigant’s procedural lapse.

The petitioner sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in filing a civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the order dated 19 December 2024 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Pakyong in Title Suit No. 09 of 2024.

Article 131 of the Limitation Act prescribes 90 days for filing a revision; the petitioner claimed a delay of 107 days, whereas the respondent asserted that the delay was 197 days.

The petitioner explained that the impugned order followed changes in legal-aid counsel, procedural steps taken before the Civil Judge, and subsequent applications seeking transfer of the suit under Section 24 CPC before the District Judge and this Court.

The District Judge rejected the transfer application on 6 June 2025, while the revision petition was filed on 5 July 2025.

The respondent opposed condonation, contending that the application and supporting affidavit did not disclose sufficient cause and omitted material facts.

Whether the petitioner had shown sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of the delay in filing the civil revision petition

Whether the period during which the petitioner pursued transfer proceedings could be excluded in computing limitation under Section 12 of the Limitation Act

Whether the petitioner should be denied relief on account of the allegedly mistaken legal advice and conduct of counsel

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which permits condonation of delay when “sufficient cause” is established.

It referred to Article 131 of the Limitation Act, prescribing a limitation period of 90 days for a revision against a decree, order, or sentence.

The Court further applied Section 12 of the Limitation Act to exclude the relevant period spent pursuing proceedings before the District Judge and this Court.

It also relied on the principles that a litigant should not ordinarily suffer for acts or mistakes of counsel and that applications for condonation of delay should be considered through a justice-oriented rather than pedantic approach.

The Court found that the delay was substantially attributable to changes in legal-aid counsel and the petitioner’s pursuit of transfer proceedings on legal advice.

Although the petitioner may have adopted an incorrect procedural course by seeking transfer instead of directly challenging the impugned order in revision, the Court held that the conduct of counsel had materially contributed to the delay and should not defeat adjudication on the merits.

The period spent pursuing the transfer application was treated as excludable under Section 12 of the Limitation Act.

Applying a liberal and justice-oriented standard, the Court concluded that sufficient cause existed for condoning the delay.

It held that the circumstances disclosed sufficient cause, that the relevant period spent in transfer proceedings was liable to be excluded, and that the petitioner should not be prejudiced by the acts or advice of counsel.

Accordingly, the delay in filing the civil revision petition was condoned, and I.A. No. 01/2025 was allowed and disposed of.

The revision petition was thereby permitted to be heard on merits.