Delhi HC Rejects Former ICSI Employee’s Challenge to Closure of Complaint Against Then-Council Member Over Alleged 2019 Insults, Citing 2½-Year Delay

In brief

The question

Whether the petition should be declined on the ground of delay and laches, given that it was filed more than two years after the impugned order.

The court held

The Court held that no ground had been made out to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226.

It also directed

The Court dismissed the writ petition on the basis of delay and laches, with the pending application also disposed of.

01Facts

The petitioner complained to the Institute of Company Secretaries of India about an alleged workplace interaction with Respondent No. 2, then a member of the Institute’s Central Council, on 29 March 2019.

p. 2 · ¶ 2–3

He alleged that Respondent No. 2 made condescending remarks, intimidated him and used insulting language.

p. 2 · ¶ 2–3

The petitioner was later suspended and dismissed from service; his challenge to that dismissal was pending in a separate writ petition.

p. 2 · ¶ 2–3

On 6 May 2024, the Institute’s Board of Discipline closed his complaint at the threshold as barred under Section 36 of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980.

p. 1 · ¶ 1

The petitioner filed the present writ petition on 22 October 2026, attributing the delay to mental and financial hardship.

pp. 2–3 · ¶ 5, 7–8

02Issues

i.Whether the petition should be declined on the ground of delay and laches, given that it was filed more than two years after the impugned order.

p. 3 · ¶ 7–9

ii.Whether, notwithstanding the delay, the Court should direct the Institute to register or reopen the petitioner’s complaint concerning the alleged 2019 interaction.

pp. 4–5 · ¶ 10–13

03Law Applied

Although no fixed limitation period governs the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ remedy must be invoked within a reasonable time; because that jurisdiction is discretionary and equitable, stale claims may be rejected for delay and laches alone.

p. 3 · ¶ 9

The Court relied on Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, (2024) 15 SCC 215, for the principle that a writ petitioner guilty of delay and laches may be non-suited on that ground.

p. 3 · ¶ 9

The Court also considered that reopening a stale, fact-dependent controversy may be inappropriate and that Article 226 is not a means to secure punishment or settle personal scores.

pp. 4–5 · ¶ 10, 12

Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Company Secretaries Act, 1980 Section 36

04Reasoning

The impugned order had been made on 6 May 2024, but the petitioner did not challenge it until 22 October 2026.

p. 3 · ¶ 7–9

The Court considered his explanation of mental and financial hardship but found it insufficient to account for the delay of more than two years and five months.

p. 3 · ¶ 7–9

The underlying complaint concerned a specific interaction in March 2019, making the dispute stale and fact-dependent; reopening disciplinary proceedings would therefore be unwarranted at this stage.

p. 4 · ¶ 10

The Court further noted that the complaint arose from an alleged interpersonal exchange and that the petitioner’s dismissal was already under challenge in separate proceedings.

pp. 2, 4–5 · ¶ 3, 11–12

It did not determine the merits of the petitioner’s contention that Section 36’s good-faith immunity was inapplicable.