Delhi HC Rejects Property Firm’s Review, Says Judgment Made No Finding It Was a “Land-Grabber,” Leaves ₹5 Lakh Costs in Place

The Review Petitioner sought review under Section 114 CPC of the High Court’s judgment dated 9 October 2025 dismissing its appeal.

It challenged observations concerning the absence of consideration and alleged misuse of judicial process, as well as the award of ₹5,00,000 in costs; it did not press its challenge to another observation about electronic communications.

The review petition was accompanied by an application to condone a 130-day delay.

The Petitioner attributed the delay to e-filing and Registry objections but did not explain the period from 16 January to 11 May 2026.

Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC confines review to discovery of new and important matter or evidence despite due diligence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or another sufficient reason analogous to those grounds.

Review is not an appeal in disguise: a decision cannot be reopened merely because it is alleged to be erroneous or another view is possible, and an error requiring detailed reasoning or reappreciation of evidence is not apparent on the face of the record.

State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, (2024) 6 SCC 46; Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715.

Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, condonation requires sufficient cause accounting for the delay.

The Court held that the challenged observation about consideration reflected the assessment of the evidence already examined in the appeal, including the absence of proof of payment; disputing that inference sought a fresh merits review.

It found that the “land-grabber” characterisation was not expressly made and that the challenged discussion had to be read in the context of the judgment’s reasoning; disagreement with that assessment did not establish an apparent error.

The costs were imposed as part of the appeal’s dismissal for being devoid of merit and an abuse of process, and the Petitioner identified no reviewable defect in that direction.

Separately, the delay explanation did not account for the period between 16 January and 11 May 2026, and assertions of diligence or merits could not replace an explanation for the entire delay.

It also held that sufficient cause had not been shown for condoning the 130-day delay.

Accordingly, it dismissed both the delay-condonation application and the Review Petition.