01Facts
The plaintiff, a Singapore company and registered proprietor of the “UTRACON” marks, had licensed its intellectual property to defendant no. 1 under a Licence Agreement dated 22 March 2012.
¶ 3–10, 14–17, 51The plaintiff alleged that, after the licence expired, defendant no. 1 and related defendants continued using the marks and associated material.
¶ 3–10, 14–17, 51It brought a suit for infringement, passing off and related reliefs; defendant no. 1 sought reference to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”).
¶ 3–10, 14–17, 51The Licence Agreement contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitration under the SIAC Rules, with Singapore as the venue.
¶ 3–10, 14–17, 51The Supreme Court had separately appointed an arbitrator under the Sale of Shares Agreement (“SOS Agreement”), while the Madras High Court had dismissed defendant no. 1’s Section 9 petition.
¶ 16–1702Issues
i.1. Whether the suit’s subject matter was covered by a valid arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and defendant no. 1.
¶ 37.1–37.2, 46–57ii.2. Whether the dispute was non-arbitrable because it concerned trade mark and copyright infringement, passing off, or rights in rem.
¶ 37.4, 68–89iii.3. Whether the presence of non-signatory defendants, or the Supreme Court and Madras High Court orders, prevented referral of the dispute to arbitration.
¶ 37.3, 37.5, 59–63, 90–9703Law Applied
Section 8 of the A&C Act requires referral where a valid arbitration agreement prima facie exists and the action concerns a matter covered by it; the referral court’s inquiry is limited and should not become a mini-trial (*Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation*, (2021) 2 SCC 1; *In Re: Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under the A&C Act and the Indian Stamp Act*, (2024) 6 SCC 1).
¶ 38–46For a foreign-seated arbitration, Section 45 requires referral unless the agreement is prima facie null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
¶ 64–67Although the grant or registration of intellectual property rights, with erga omnes effect, is non-arbitrable, disputes between identified parties concerning subordinate rights in personam—such as contractual rights to use a mark—may be arbitrated (*Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd.*, (2011) 5 SCC 532; *Vidya Drolia*; *K. Mangayarkarasi v. N.J. Sundaresan*, (2025) 8 SCC 299).
¶ 69–80Under *Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India (P) Ltd.*, (2024) 4 SCC 1, whether a non-signatory is bound may be left to the arbitral tribunal where the pleadings and transaction indicate a composite arrangement.
¶ 93–96Provisions in the judgment · 13 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 2Section 8Section 9Section 11Section 16Section 21Section 44Section 45
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 89Section 151
Trade Marks Act, 1999 Section 134
Copyright Act, 1957 Section 62Section 37
04Reasoning
The plaintiff’s claims against defendant no. 1 relied on the Licence Agreement’s post-termination obligations, making the dispute one “regarding” that agreement and within Clause 14’s scope.
¶ 47–58Expiry of the licence did not extinguish its arbitration clause, and disputed questions about extension, breach and limitation were not manifestly determinable at the referral stage.
¶ 47–58The foreign venue meant Section 45, rather than Section 8, was the applicable provision for the Licence Agreement arbitration; the court found no prima facie basis to invalidate or displace the clause.
¶ 64–67The suit did not seek registration, rectification or cancellation of a mark; it concerned the parties’ competing claims to use the marks and would result in relief binding the defendants, not the world at large.
¶ 73–80, 85–88The plaintiff’s own case described defendants nos. 1–7 as a single economic unit, and its pleaded claims against defendants nos. 2–7 derived from or were connected with defendant no. 1’s alleged use.
¶ 90–97Whether those non-signatories were bound was for the tribunal to decide.
¶ 90–97The Supreme Court’s appointment under the SOS Agreement and the Madras High Court’s Section 9 orders did not decide whether Clause 14 covered this suit.
¶ 59–63, 90–9705Holding
The Court held that the suit concerned an arbitrable, inter partes dispute covered by Clause 14 of the Licence Agreement and that the agreement was not shown to be prima facie invalid, inoperative or incapable of performance.
¶ 98It allowed I.A. 41705/2024 and referred the parties to arbitration under Clause 14.
¶ 99–101The suit and all pending applications were consequently disposed of, without expressing an opinion on the merits.
¶ 101–103Original Court PDF
Utracon Corporation Pte LtdvsUcon Pt Structural System Private Limited Formerly Utracon Structural Systems Private Limited & Ors.
Click to open original judgment
Original judgment, available to read, download and summarize on LawLens.in
