Delhi HC Upholds Finding Hospital Illegally Abolished Union Member’s Post During Pending Dispute, Awards ₹3 Lakh Compensation

The respondent was appointed permanently as an Assistant Housekeeper in 1995.

On 8 September 1998, the petitioner informed him that his post had been abolished and sent him one month’s pay.

While Industrial Dispute No. 96/98 was pending, the respondent, through his union, complained under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Tribunal held that the abolition contravened Sections 9A and 33 and directed reinstatement.

The petitioner challenged that award.

During the writ proceedings, the respondent was reinstated from 1 March 2008 and received ₹1,55,049 under Section 17B for the period from 3 August 2004 to 29 February 2008.

The petitioner later terminated him on 29 May 2026 following a domestic inquiry.

Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 requires prescribed notice before an employer effects a change in a workman’s conditions of service concerning a matter in the Fourth Schedule.

Section 33 restricts an employer from prejudicially altering service conditions or taking specified disciplinary action during the pendency of proceedings before the statutory authorities identified in that provision.

Under Articles 226 and 227, a High Court does not reappreciate evidence and ordinarily interferes with a Tribunal’s findings only where they are perverse, unsupported by relevant evidence, patently illegal, or jurisdictionally defective (International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers Union).

Section 33 protection depends on proceedings being pending before a specified statutory authority; pendency of a writ petition alone does not satisfy that requirement (B.P.L. Ltd. v. R. Sudhakar).

Reinstatement and full back wages are not automatic whenever a termination is found unlawful; relief may be moulded to the circumstances, including through lump-sum compensation (Allahabad Bank v. Krishan Pal Singh).

The Tribunal’s finding was supported by evidence that Industrial Dispute No. 96/98 was pending when the post was abolished and that the respondent was an active union member representing workmen in that dispute.

The communication of 8 September 1998 conveyed a decision already taken and did not establish compliance with Section 9A; the Tribunal’s conclusion disclosed no basis for writ interference.

Section 33 did not govern the 2026 termination because the underlying Tribunal complaint had concluded in the 2004 award, and the High Court’s stay of that award did not revive or continue proceedings before the Tribunal.

The legality of the 2026 termination was therefore left to the appropriate forum.

Since reinstatement had occurred and Section 17B wages had been paid for the period following the award, the remaining claim concerned the period between cessation of service in 1998 and the award in 2004; the Court considered lump-sum compensation appropriate.

It held that Section 33 did not apply to the 2026 termination merely because the writ petition was pending, leaving the respondent free to challenge that termination before the appropriate forum.

As reinstatement no longer survived for consideration and Section 17B benefits had been paid, the Court modified the award and ordered the petitioner to pay ₹3,00,000 in full and final satisfaction of the surviving relief within four weeks.

The petition and pending application were disposed of accordingly.