01Facts
The petitioners, Associate Professors at Kalindi College, complained that four faculty members had subjected them to harassment, intimidation and sexually coloured remarks.
¶ 3–10 · pp. 2–6The earlier Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) found that the allegations were not sexual in nature; its report was accepted by the College’s Governing Body.
¶ 3–10 · pp. 2–6On the petitioners’ appeal, the Vice-Chancellor set aside the inquiry, citing the participation of a member named in the events and non-compliance with the requirement for an external member, and directed a fresh inquiry by a properly constituted committee.
¶ 3–10 · pp. 2–6The Principal then constituted a new Internal Committee (IC).
¶ 3–10 · pp. 2–6The petitioners challenged both the Vice-Chancellor’s order and the new IC, alleging, among other things, bias in the Principal’s role and in the composition of the committee.
¶ 3–10, 17 · pp. 2–6, 9–1002Issues
i.1. Whether the Vice-Chancellor’s Speaking Order dated 16 July 2026 was legally infirm, including for want of a personal hearing or a University-level inquiry committee.
¶ 17, 24–28 · pp. 9–15ii.2. Whether the Principal’s constitution of the new IC was vitiated by bias.
¶ 17, 29–33 · pp. 9, 16–19iii.3. Whether the new IC’s composition or the petitioners’ other objections warranted writ relief.
¶ 17, 34–37 · pp. 9, 19–2103Law Applied
Section 4 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 requires an employer to constitute an Internal Committee; Section 11(4) requires the inquiry to be completed within 90 days.
¶ 18 · p. 10Regulation 4(1) of the UGC (Prevention of Sexual Harassment of Women Employees and Students in Higher Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2015 prescribes the committee’s composition and vests nomination in the Executive Authority; Regulation 4(3) excludes specified senior administrative officers to preserve the committee’s autonomy.
¶ 18 · p. 10A bias challenge requires cogent material establishing a real likelihood or danger of bias; a mere apprehension is insufficient (G.N. Nayak v. Goa University; ABP (P) Ltd. v. Union of India; Somaya Gupta v. Jawaharlal Nehru University).
¶ 29–32 · pp. 16–18The absence of a personal hearing does not, by itself, invalidate a decision where no resulting prejudice is shown (Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan).
¶ 24–26 · pp. 13–14The statutory inquiry must be conducted by the designated IC, rather than by a parallel fact-finding body (Prof. Rasal Singh v. University of Delhi).
¶ 19, 27 · pp. 10–11, 15Provisions in the judgment · 3 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 Section 16Section 4Section 11
04Reasoning
The Court held that the Vice-Chancellor’s order granted the principal relief sought—setting aside the earlier inquiry and directing a fresh inquiry—and that the written appeal and representations had been considered; the petitioners showed no prejudice from not receiving a personal hearing.
¶ 23–26 · pp. 12–14Once the earlier inquiry was found unsustainable, the Vice-Chancellor could not undertake the fact-finding himself, and neither the PoSH Act nor the UGC Regulations authorised a University-level committee for this College workplace.
¶ 27–28 · pp. 14–15The earlier court order merely recorded the petitioners’ submissions and made no finding that the Principal was biased.
¶ 21–22 · pp. 11–12The Principal was not a respondent to the complaint, and her prior administrative decisions did not establish a personal or pecuniary interest in its outcome.
¶ 33–36 · pp. 18–20Nor did a faculty member’s attendance at the relevant staff meeting, or a non-teaching employee’s ordinary administrative subordination to the Principal, establish disqualifying bias.
¶ 33–36 · pp. 18–20The external-member requirement was met by the appointment of a law professor unconnected with the College or parties.
¶ 33–36 · pp. 18–2005Holding
The Court dismissed the petition, finding no infirmity in the Vice-Chancellor’s Speaking Order or in the constitution of the new IC.
¶ 37–39 · pp. 20–21It directed the new IC to proceed in accordance with the PoSH Act, Rules and UGC Regulations, observe natural justice, and endeavour to conclude the inquiry within 90 days of receiving the judgment.
¶ 38 · p. 21Original Court PDF
Dr. Xxxxxxxx And Anr.vsUniversity Of Delhi & Ors.
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