Delhi High Court quashes externment order based on minor excise and gambling cases, stresses need for material showing violence or public danger

The petitioner challenged an externment order dated 12 March 2026 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police under Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, and the appellate order dated 29 April 2026 dismissing his appeal.

The externment order directed the petitioner to remove himself from the National Capital Territory of Delhi for one year, while permitting his attendance at court hearings subject to his immediately leaving Delhi thereafter.

The petitioner argued that the proceedings were based only on two cases under the Delhi Public Gambling Act and two cases under Section 33 of the Delhi Excise Act, and that such cases did not establish that he posed a threat to society.

The appellate authority noted that the petitioner had been involved in four cases between 2020 and 2024, had been convicted in two cases and fined, and that three FIRs had been registered against him in 2024.

Whether the externment order satisfied the statutory requirements of Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978

Whether the petitioner’s involvement in cases under the Gambling Act and Delhi Excise Act constituted sufficient material to establish that his movements or acts caused, or were calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm, or that he was a desperate and dangerous person requiring externment

Whether the appellate authority’s order disclosed a lawful and objective consideration of the statutory requirements under Section 47

The Court applied Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, which permits externment where a person’s movements or acts cause or are calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm; where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is engaged or about to be engaged in specified serious offences, including offences involving force or violence; or where the person is so desperate and dangerous that his presence is hazardous to the community, subject also to the statutory requirement concerning the unwillingness of witnesses to testify publicly due to apprehension for their safety or property.

The Explanation to Section 47 creates a deeming rule of habituality where a person has been involved in the specified acts on at least three occasions within the preceding year.

The Court held that externment is an extraordinary measure restricting the fundamental right to movement under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution and must therefore be exercised sparingly, only in extraordinary circumstances and on clear, present and credible material, relying on Prem Chand v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 639, and Deepak v. State of Maharashtra, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1999.

It further relied on Mahesh Shrivastava @ Jeeva v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2025:DHC:9148, for the principle that minor, non-violent or regulatory offences under statutes such as the Delhi Excise Act or Delhi Public Gambling Act, absent objective evidence of danger, violence or witness intimidation, do not ordinarily meet the threshold of Section 47.

The Court examined the externment and appellate orders and found that neither order recorded material demonstrating that the petitioner’s movements or acts caused or were calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm, or that he was involved in offences involving force or violence or the other offences specified in Section 47.

The appellate authority relied primarily on the petitioner’s involvement in four gambling and excise cases, recovery of illicit liquor, two convictions carrying fines, and the registration of three FIRs in 2024.

However, the Court held that the mere number of such cases and the alleged recovery of illicit liquor did not establish that the petitioner was “desperate and dangerous,” nor did the orders identify any objective material showing that witnesses were unwilling to testify publicly because of fear for their safety or property, as required by Section 47.

The authorities therefore failed to demonstrate the requisite statutory satisfaction, and the externment was found to be a mechanical and legally insufficient restriction on the petitioner’s liberty.

Both orders were accordingly set aside.

The writ petition was disposed of, and the pending application was also disposed of.