Departmental inquiries into police conduct may proceed independently of pending criminal proceedings.

The petitioner lodged a complaint alleging that respondents 11–14 had fraudulently obtained ₹1,20,000 from him by promising a government job and had issued a forged appointment letter.

Following a preliminary inquiry, Crime No. 243/2021 was registered; the police filed a charge-sheet before the JMFC, Mungeli, cognizance was taken, and charges were framed against the accused.

Subsequently, on complaints by the accused before the Human Rights Commission, the police authorities conducted further and parallel inquiries into several criminal cases, including Crime No. 243/2021, and examined the conduct of police officials involved in registering and investigating those cases.

The petitioner alleged that these inquiries were conducted without notice to him, without recording his statement, and behind his back, and that consequential departmental proceedings were initiated against police officials.

He sought quashing of the inquiry reports, communications, charge memo and consequential proceedings, production of records, and compensation under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The State opposed the petition, submitting that the inquiries concerned police negligence and misconduct, were conducted by a competent Special Investigation Team, and did not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the pending criminal case.

1. Whether the police authorities’ further or parallel administrative inquiries and consequential departmental proceedings, conducted after filing of the charge-sheet and framing of charges in Crime No. 243/2021, were impermissible without prior permission of the criminal court.

2. Whether the impugned inquiries and departmental proceedings violated the petitioner’s right to natural justice, or were arbitrary, mala fide, without jurisdiction, or otherwise prejudicial to his legally enforceable rights.

3. Whether the petitioner was entitled to quashing of the impugned proceedings, production of records, compensation, or any other relief under Article 226.

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, under which interference with administrative or departmental proceedings is warranted where there is a jurisdictional error, manifest arbitrariness, mala fides, illegality, or violation of natural justice.

It held that an administrative or departmental inquiry into the conduct, negligence, or misconduct of police officials is distinct from the criminal adjudication of the guilt or innocence of accused persons and may proceed independently.

The Court further held that such an inquiry does not require prior permission from the criminal court merely because a related criminal case is pending, particularly where the departmental proceedings concern official conduct rather than the determination of criminal liability.

The petitioner must also demonstrate specific prejudice to a legally enforceable right before obtaining extraordinary relief under Article 226.

No specific precedent was cited in the judgment.

The Court found that the impugned inquiries were directed principally at examining alleged irregularities and negligence by police officials in the registration and investigation of various cases, rather than at deciding whether respondents 11–14 were guilty or innocent in the pending criminal trial.

Consequently, the pendency of the criminal proceedings and the framing of charges did not bar the departmental action or require prior permission of the trial court.

Although the petitioner alleged that he was not heard and that the inquiries were mala fide, the State asserted that he had been informed of the complaints and given an opportunity to respond.

The Court held that the petitioner failed to establish the requisite jurisdictional error, arbitrariness, mala fides, illegality, or specific prejudice to his legally enforceable rights.

His opportunity to prove the allegations remained available in the pending criminal proceedings before the competent court.

It held that the administrative inquiries and departmental proceedings concerning police officials were legally distinct from the pending criminal prosecution, did not require prior permission of the criminal court, and were not shown to violate natural justice or the petitioner’s legally enforceable rights.

The writ petition was dismissed, and no order was made as to costs.