Departmental proceedings cannot be sustained on vague charges.

The applicant, an Inspector in the Delhi Police, was proceeded against departmentally for allegedly losing an official Tetra wireless set while returning home after performing duty at the Lahore Bus Sewa terminal on the intervening night of 11–12 February 2013.

An FIR under Section 379 IPC concerning theft of the wireless set was also registered at Police Station Seemapuri.

The Inquiry Officer examined five prosecution witnesses, framed the charge under Rule 16(iv)(b) of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980, and found the charge proved, recommending major-penalty action.

The disciplinary authority imposed forfeiture of five years’ approved service permanently and directed that the suspension period from 5 March 2013 to 18 November 2013 be treated as period not spent on duty.

The appellate authority rejected the applicant’s appeal on limitation by order dated 3 February 2016.

The applicant challenged the inquiry findings, punishment orders, addendum and appellate orders under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

1. Whether the departmental charge that the applicant had lost the official wireless set through negligence, while an FIR alleging theft of the same set had also been registered, was vague and legally sustainable.

2. Whether the allegations that the applicant failed to seek medical assistance after becoming unconscious and failed to note the auto-rickshaw number disclosed a punishable act of misconduct.

3. Whether the Inquiry Officer violated the principles of natural justice by putting questions to PW-5 without thereafter giving the applicant an opportunity to cross-examine that witness.

4. Whether the Inquiry Officer failed to consider the unchallenged evidence of the defence witnesses and thereby rendered the inquiry findings perverse or unsustainable.

The Tribunal applied Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980, particularly Rule 16(iv)(b), governing the departmental inquiry and framing of charges.

It relied on Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78, which holds that departmental charges must be specific and definite, inquiries must comply with statutory requirements and natural justice, findings must not be perverse or based on conjecture, and every act or omission does not constitute misconduct.

It further relied on Inspector Prem Chand v. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2007) 4 SCC 566, under which misconduct involves an element of ill motive, whereas negligence, an error of judgment or an innocent mistake does not by itself constitute misconduct.

The Tribunal also applied the principle that where an Inquiry Officer examines or questions a witness beyond clarification, the delinquent employee must be afforded an opportunity of cross-examination; otherwise, the inquiry violates natural justice, as recognised in Commissioner of Police v. Bikram Singh.

Unchallenged defence testimony must ordinarily be accepted where no cross-examination discredits it, as recognised in GNCT of Delhi v. ASI Rambir Singh.

The Tribunal held that the charge was legally deficient because it proceeded on the basis that the applicant had “lost” the wireless set, while the respondents had simultaneously registered an FIR alleging theft of the same article.

The charge did not identify any reckless conduct, ill motive or ulterior purpose attributable to the applicant; therefore, mere loss of the equipment could not automatically amount to misconduct under Prem Chand.

The allegation that the applicant failed to obtain medical assistance while unconscious was considered inherently improbable, since an unconscious person could not reasonably be expected to seek medical aid.

The charge regarding failure to note the auto-rickshaw number was likewise not shown to establish culpable negligence.

The inquiry was independently vitiated because, after PW-5 was not cross-examined, the Inquiry Officer put material questions to him regarding the wireless set and its issue to the applicant, but did not provide the applicant an opportunity to cross-examine him thereafter.

This denied the applicant a fair opportunity to test the evidence and violated natural justice.

The Tribunal also found that the Inquiry Officer failed to appreciate the applicant’s defence evidence.

The statements of DW-1 to DW-3, particularly DW-1’s evidence that the applicant had informed the Control Room about the theft, had not been challenged in cross-examination and therefore could not be disregarded without adequate reasons.

The respondents’ arguments concerning contradictions, delay in registration of the FIR and alleged fabrication were held to be extraneous because they were not themselves the subject of the framed charge; moreover, the burden remained on the department to prove the misconduct.

It held that the charges were vague, improbable and insufficient to establish misconduct, and that the inquiry was vitiated by denial of cross-examination and failure to consider material defence evidence.

The Tribunal accordingly allowed the Original Application and set aside the inquiry findings dated 25 July 2014, the punishment orders dated 11 November 2014 and 24 February 2015, the addendum dated 1 April 2015, and the appellate orders dated 27 January 2016 and 3 February 2016.

The applicant was held entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions, to be granted preferably within six weeks of receipt of the certified copy of the order.

No order as to costs was made.