Departmental punishment cannot survive a merits acquittal when both proceedings rest on identical evidence and witnesses.

The petitioner, a Revenue Inspector, was accused of demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹4,000 for entering the complainant’s name in the revenue khata.

A criminal case was registered under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and a departmental inquiry was initiated on the same allegations.

In the criminal case, the Sessions Court acquitted the petitioner and the co-accused, finding material inconsistencies in the evidence of the complainant and shadow witness, absence of reliable proof of demand or acceptance, and deficiencies in the electronic evidence and trap proceedings.

Despite the acquittal, the departmental inquiry held the petitioner guilty and recommended compulsory retirement with permanent withholding of 25% of his pension.

The Government imposed that penalty by order dated 23 July 2019.

The Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal dismissed the petitioner’s challenge on 28 September 2022, holding that departmental proceedings operate on the standard of preponderance of probabilities and are independent of criminal proceedings.

The petitioner consequently invoked Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court.

Whether an acquittal in a criminal prosecution automatically invalidates or requires setting aside a penalty imposed in departmental proceedings based on the same allegations?

Whether, where the criminal and departmental proceedings are founded on substantially identical charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances, and the criminal court has found that the prosecution failed to establish demand and acceptance, it would be unjust, unfair and oppressive to sustain the departmental penalty?

Whether the Tribunal erred in refusing to interfere with the penalty solely on the ground that the departmental standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities?

The Court applied the principle that criminal and departmental proceedings ordinarily operate in distinct fields: criminal guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas departmental misconduct may be established on a preponderance of probabilities; therefore, an acquittal does not, by itself, bar or invalidate departmental action, as held in Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju, State of Karnataka v. Umesh and Director Marketing of Agricultural v. D. Khasim Saheb.

However, under the exception recognised in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, where the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances in both proceedings are identical or substantially similar, and the criminal court has acquitted the accused after fully considering and disbelieving the prosecution case, sustaining the departmental penalty may be unjust, unfair and oppressive.

The Court also applied the judicial-review principles that departmental findings must be based on some relevant evidence, comply with natural justice and statutory procedure, be free from perversity, and not attract a disproportionate penalty.

The terminology of “benefit of doubt” or “honourable acquittal” is not decisive; the substance of the criminal judgment must be examined.

The Court distinguished the ordinary rule of departmental independence from the exceptional case warranting judicial interference.

Here, the departmental charge was founded on the very same allegation of demand and acceptance of ₹4,000 that formed the basis of the criminal prosecution.

The principal witnesses in the criminal case—the complainant and the shadow witness—did not support the prosecution’s case, and the criminal court found that their versions were inconsistent regarding who demanded the bribe, who received the money, and whether the petitioner directed the co-accused to accept it.

The court also found the voice recording and transcript unreliable and held that the recovery and chemical test, without proof of conscious and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification, were insufficient.

The departmental proceeding relied on substantially the same evidentiary foundation and did not disclose independent or additional evidence capable of sustaining the charge.

Accordingly, the Tribunal’s reliance solely on the different standard of proof was inadequate.

Since the evidentiary basis of the departmental finding had collapsed in the criminal judgment, continuing the severe penalty of compulsory retirement and permanent pension reduction would be unjust and oppressive.

Application No.10346 of 2019 before the Tribunal was consequently allowed.

The petitioner was granted consequential service and retiral benefits; the period from compulsory retirement until the date on which he would have attained superannuation was directed to be counted as qualifying service.

However, he was denied arrears of salary for that period.

The respondents were directed to calculate and disburse the consequential monetary and retiral benefits within three months of receiving the judgment.