DGCA can classify Pipistrel aircraft as Light Sport Aircraft; flying hours cannot count toward CPL, Delhi High Court rules

The Appellant was involved in the development and operation of the Government Aviation Training Institute (GATI) under an LDO Agreement dated 03.11.2008.

The Pipistrel Virus SW 121 aircraft received EASA type certification on the basis of CS-LSA, although EASA described it as falling within the “Normal” airworthiness category.

The DGCA accepted the EASA type certification, permitted import of two aircraft, registered them as VT-DPA and VT-DPB, and issued Certificates of Airworthiness (CoAs) describing them as “Normal” category aircraft.

In the 2023 list of approved FTOs, however, the two aircraft were identified as Light Sport Aircraft (LSAs).

Following GATI’s objections, the DGCA issued a communication dated 26.02.2024 classifying the Pipistrel aircraft as LSAs; thereafter, applications by student pilots for Commercial Pilot Licences (CPLs) were rejected because substantial portions of their flying experience had been acquired on the Pipistrel.

The learned Single Judge declined to interfere with the DGCA’s communication and the rejection orders, leading to the present intra-court appeal.

Whether the DGCA was justified in classifying the Pipistrel aircraft as LSAs by its communication dated 26.02.2024.

Whether flying experience acquired by Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 on the Pipistrel could be counted towards the 200-hour aeroplane-experience requirement for grant of a CPL, notwithstanding the subsistence of the CoAs.

The Court applied Section 5A of the Aircraft Act, 1934, now corresponding to the Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024, recognising the DGCA’s power and responsibility as the expert statutory regulator to classify and periodically reassess aircraft.

Rule 3(33AA) of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 and the applicable Civil Aviation Requirements (CARs), including CAR Section 2, Series F, Part XXIII, governed the LSA classification.

The Court distinguished airworthiness under a CoA from the separate question of whether flying experience is reckonable for pilot licensing under Schedule II to the Rules.

Section ‘J’ of Schedule II requires 200 hours of flying experience on aeroplanes for a CPL, while Section ‘E’, paragraph 1(e)(v), permits only a limited maximum of 20 hours of specified LSA solo experience for a Private Pilot Licence, not a CPL.

The Court further held that foreign type-certification descriptions, the Working Arrangement between DGCA and EASA, and Article 33 of the Chicago Convention did not override India’s domestic licensing framework.

Judicial review of technical regulatory determinations is limited to cases of manifest arbitrariness, perversity, mala fides, or breach of the statutory framework; there can be no estoppel against the exercise of a statutory function.

The Court held that the fact that EASA described the aircraft as “Normal” did not prevent the DGCA from considering CS-LSA, the certification specification recorded in the EASA Type Certificate Data Sheet, while determining the domestic licensing consequences of flying experience.

The CoAs established the aircraft’s airworthiness but did not determine whether experience acquired on them qualified as aeroplane experience for a CPL; consequently, cancellation of the CoAs or issuance of Special CoAs was unnecessary.

The DGCA’s prior approvals, including approval of the maintenance plan and training manuals, could not create an estoppel or prevent correction of an erroneous regulatory position.

The Court deferred to the DGCA’s technical assessment of the relevant stall-speed parameter and found no perversity or mala fides.

It also rejected the natural-justice challenge because GATI had made repeated representations, attended a DGCA meeting, and had its objections considered by an Expert Committee before the communication was issued.

Since more than 90 hours claimed by each student pilot had been flown on the Pipistrel, and LSA experience could not be counted towards the CPL’s 200-hour aeroplane requirement, the rejection orders were legally sustainable.

The rejection of the CPL applications was therefore affirmed.

The appeal was dismissed, all pending applications were disposed of, and there was no order as to costs.

The Court clarified that its judgment would not affect separate proceedings concerning termination of the LDO Agreement.