Discharging a police employee merely because a criminal case was pending was illegal; Supreme Court awards ₹5 lakh compensation

The appellant was appointed as a Special Police Officer in Police District Batala on 17 October 1991 and was later selected for appointment as a Constable in the First Indian Reserve Battalion, Patiala.

Although he reported for joining on 30 August 2002, he was not permitted to join because a criminal case under Sections 324/326/34 IPC was pending against him.

Separately, on 14 January 2003, he was discharged from his existing service solely with reference to the pending criminal proceedings.

The appellant was subsequently convicted under Section 324 IPC, while his conviction under Section 326 IPC was set aside in appeal; he was released on probation, with the appellate court observing that the conviction would not affect his service career.

The trial court decreed the suit and directed reinstatement with continuity of service and consequential benefits, but denied back wages.

The first appellate court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit, and the High Court dismissed the appellant’s second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant challenged the legality of his discharge and sought reinstatement or, alternatively, damages.

Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, removes only statutory disqualifications attaching to a conviction; release on probation does not obliterate the conviction or confer an absolute right to continue in public service.

The Court relied on Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellapan, Trikha Ram v. V.K. Seth, Union of India v. Bakshi Ram, Karam Singh v. State of Punjab, DIG of Police v. P.R.K. Mohan, Shankar Dass v. Union of India, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ranjit Singh, Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan, and Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank, which establish that conviction may justify disciplinary action notwithstanding probation.

Under the second proviso to Article 311(2), a civil servant may be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank on the basis of conviction without a departmental enquiry, subject to the constitutional scheme.

However, mere pendency of a criminal case, without conviction or other lawful authority, does not by itself justify termination of a public employee, particularly without notice or an opportunity to defend.

Further, the civil court could not grant reinstatement in view of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and the appellant’s failure to challenge the discharge order materially restricted the relief available.

The Supreme Court could nevertheless mould relief and do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution.

The Court rejected the appellant’s principal reliance on Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act.

It held that probation did not erase his conviction, and the Sessions Court’s observation that the conviction would not affect his service career could not override the settled law permitting service consequences based on conviction.

Nevertheless, the respondents’ actual action in 2003 was not based on the later conviction but solely on the pendency of the criminal case.

At that stage, no conviction had been recorded, the appellant was not given notice or an opportunity of hearing, and the respondents identified no legal provision authorising discharge of a police employee merely because criminal proceedings were pending.

The subsequent conviction could not retrospectively validate the original discharge, since the legality of the order had to be assessed when it was made.

Although the appellant had not challenged the discharge order, had framed the suit improperly, and could not obtain reinstatement through the civil action, the respondents’ admitted conduct remained illegal and arbitrary.

In view of the procedural and evidentiary deficiencies, the Court declined to order reinstatement but invoked Article 142 to grant monetary compensation.

Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act did not entitle him to reinstatement or prevent service action based on conviction.

However, because the discharge order had not been challenged, the suit was procedurally defective, and reinstatement could not be granted by the civil court under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, the Court did not direct reinstatement.

Exercising power under Article 142, it directed the respondents to pay the appellant compensation of ₹5,00,000 within three months.

The appeal was accordingly disposed of.