Dismissal based on unproved FIR and medical report constitutes punishment founded on no evidence.

The petitioner, a constable in the Bihar Military Police, was deputed for law-and-order duty during the visit of the Dalai Lama at Gaya.

He was allegedly found absent from duty and was apprehended at Islampur, Nalanda, along with another constable, Bablu Kumar.

Both were allegedly intoxicated, resulting in registration of Islampur P.S. Case No. 22 of 2018 under Section 37(b)(d) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016.

A medical examination allegedly recorded the smell of alcohol in the petitioner’s breath.

The petitioner was served with a departmental charge-sheet alleging absence from duty and consumption of liquor.

The Enquiry Officer found the charges proved, and, after consideration of the petitioner’s second show-cause reply, the disciplinary authority dismissed him from service by Memo No. 1855 dated 28 July 2019.

His departmental appeal was rejected by the Deputy Inspector General of Police through Memo No. 1404 dated 6 December 2019.

The petitioner challenged both orders, contending that the charge of alcohol consumption was unsupported by a breath-analyser, blood, or urine test and that neither the doctor nor the author of the FIR had been examined.

He also relied on the setting aside of the identical dismissal imposed on Bablu Kumar in C.W.J.C. No. 5086 of 2020.

Whether the finding that the petitioner had consumed liquor was legally sustainable when the medical report and FIR were not proved through examination of their authors and no scientific test was produced?

Whether the disciplinary and appellate orders were vitiated by violation of procedural fairness, failure to consider the petitioner’s defence, and absence of adequate reasons?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to relief on the ground of parity, since the dismissal of the co-accused constable arising from the same occurrence had already been set aside?

In departmental proceedings, strict rules of the Indian Evidence Act do not ordinarily apply, and charges may be established on a preponderance of probabilities; however, findings must still be based on legally acceptable material and the procedure must comply with natural justice, fairness, and reasonableness.

Mere production or tendering of a document does not, by itself, prove its contents, as recognised in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570.

The Court also relied on State of Bihar v. Dharmraj Singh @ Dhamraj Singh, 2026 (5) PLJR 51, concerning proof of misconduct in departmental proceedings.

Where a major penalty, particularly dismissal, is imposed, the disciplinary authority must independently consider the employee’s defence and give reasons for rejecting it; an order lacking reasons is legally infirm.

Upon quashing an illegal dismissal, consequential benefits are governed by the principles stated in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324.

The Court found the petitioner’s case materially identical to that of Bablu Kumar, who had been apprehended in the same incident, faced the same departmental allegations, and received the same punishment.

Although the medical report and FIR were relied upon, the doctor who conducted the medical examination and the author of the FIR were not examined, and there was no breath, blood, or urine test independently establishing alcohol consumption.

The Court held that the allegation could not be treated as proved merely by relying on unproved documentary material, particularly where the petitioner disputed the charge.

The disciplinary authority also failed to provide a reasoned consideration of the petitioner’s second show-cause reply, while the appellate authority failed to properly scrutinise the challenge.

Since the dismissal of the similarly situated co-accused had already been quashed on the same evidentiary and procedural grounds, denial of equivalent relief to the petitioner would be unjustified.

The Court accordingly set aside the Commandant’s dismissal order dated 28 July 2019 and the appellate order dated 6 December 2019.

The petitioner was entitled to consequential benefits in accordance with Deepali Gundu Surwase.

The writ petition was therefore allowed.